# 1NC

**\*1NC T – Restriction**

1. ***Interpretation -- ‘Restrictions’ must be direct and immediate limitations***

**Veeraswami**, former India Madras High Court chief justice, 19**66**

(CJ, “T.M. Kannappa Mudaliar And Ors. vs The State Of Madras” Majority opinion, <http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/838831/>)

The collection of a toll or a tax for the use of a road or for the use of a bridge or for the use of an aerodrome is no barrier or burden or deterrent to traders, who, in their absence, may have to take a longer or less convenient or more expensive route. Such compensatory taxes are no hindrance to anybody's freedom so long as they remain reasonable; but they could of course, be converted into a hindrance to the freedom of trade. If the authorities concerned really wanted to hamper anybody's trade they could easily raise the amount of tax or toll to an amount which would be prohibitive or deterrent or create other impediments which instead of facilitating trade and commerce would hamper them. It is here that the contrast, between 'freedom' (Article 301) and 'restrictions' (Articles 302 and 304) clearly appears; that which in reality facilitates trade and commerce is not a restriction, and that which in reality hampers or burdens trade and commerce is a restriction. It is the reality or substance of the matter that has to be determined. It is not possible apriori to draw a dividing line between that which would really be a charge for a facility provided and that which would really be a deterrent to a trade, but the distinction, if it has to be drawn is real and clear. For the tax to become a prohibited tax it has to be a direct tax the effect of which is to hinder the movement part of trade. So long as a tax remains compensatory or regulatory it cannot operate as a hindrance. 12. Subba Rao, J. as he then was, concurring with Das, J. took substantially the same view and observed (at page 1430);: The word ' freedom ' is not capable of precise definition, but it can be stated what would infringe or detract from the said freedom. Before a particular law can be said to infringe the said freedom, it must be ascertained whether the impugned provision operates as a restriction impeding the free movement of trade or only as a regulation facilitating the same. Restrictions obstruct the freedom, whereas regulations promote it. Police regulations, though they may superficially appear to restrict the freedom of movement, in fact provide the necessary conditions for the free movement. Regulations such as provision for lighting, speed, good condition of vehicles, timings, rule of the road and similar others, really facilitate the freedom of movement rather than retard it. So too, licensing system with compensatory fees would not be restrictions but regulatory provisions;, for without it, the necessary lines of communication such as roads, waterways and airways, cannot effectively be maintained and the freedom declared may in practice turn out to be an empty one....It is for the Court in a given case to decide whether a provision purporting to regulate trade is in fact a restriction on freedom. The further observations as to what was meant by Restrictions in Article 302 are (at page 1433): But the more difficult question is, what does the word " restrictions " mean in Article 302? The dictionary meaning of the word " restrict" is "to confine, bound, limit." Therefore any limitations placed upon the freedom is a restriction on that freedom. But the limitation must be real, direct and immediate, but not fanciful, indirect or remote....Of all the doctrines evolved in my view, the doctrine of ' direct and immediate effect' on the freedom would be a reasonable solvent to the difficult situation that might arise under our Constitution. If a law, whatever may have been its source, directly and immediately affects the free movement of trade, it would be restriction on the said freedom. But a law which may have only indirect and remote repercussions on the said freedom cannot be considered to be a restriction on it. 13. Subba Rao, J., as he then was summed up his views in the following words (at page 1436): The foregoing discussions may be summarised in the following propositions : (1) Article 301 declares a right of free movement of trade without any obstructions by way of barriers, inter-State or intra-State or other impediments operating as such barriers. (2) The said freedom is not impeded, but on the other hand, promoted by regulations creating conditions for the free movement of trade, such as, police regulations, provision for services, maintenance of roads, provision for aerodromes, wharfs, etc. with or without compensation. (3) Parliament may by law impose restrictions on such freedom in the public interest and the said law can be made by virtue of any entry with respect whereof Parliament has power to make a law. (4) The State also, in exercise of its legislative power, may impose similar restrictions, subject to the two conditions laid down in Article 304 (b) and subject to the Proviso mentioned therein. (5) Neither Parliament nor the State Legislature can make a law giving preference to one State over another or making discrimination between one State and another, by virtue of any entry in the Lists, infringing the said freedom. (6) This ban is lifted in the case of Parliament for the purpose of dealing with situations arising out of scarcity of goods in any part of the territory of India and also in the case of a State under Article 304 (h), subject to the conditions mentioned therein. And (7) the State can impose a non-discriminatory tax on goods imported from other States or the Union territory to which similar goods manufactured or produced in the State are subject. 14. It is thus well established that regulatory provisions which do not directly or immediately impede or burden the free movement of trade, commerce and intercourse but provide or intend to provide facilities for trade, commerce and intercourse are not restrictions within the meaning of Part XIII and are compatible with the freedom of trade declared by Article 301. Atiabari Tea Co., Ltd. v. State of Assam , and Automobile Transport Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan , are both cases of imposition of tax. The first was concerned with the Assam Taxation (on Goods carried by Roads or Inland Waterways) Act, 1954,, which was successfully attacked on the ground that it violated Article 301 and was not saved by Article 304 (b). The Act imposed a tax on specified goods transported by road or inland waterways in the State of Assam. The majority in that case held that the Act put a direct restriction on the freedom of trade and, since in doing so, had not complied with the provisions of Article 304 (b), it must be declared to be void. In the second case the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1951, was impugned as violating Article 301. But the majority did not accept the contention on the view that the Act was merely a regulatory measure imposing compensatory taxes for the use of trading facilities. The scope of Article 301 was again in the light of the earlier decisions referred to in Khyerbari Tea Co. v. State of Assam , where the Assam Taxation (On goods carried by Roads or Inland Waterways) Act as amended after Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam , was attacked on various grounds but without success. 15. As already seen, the distinction between a restriction and a regulation is fine but real, though the dividing line is not capable in the nature of things of a comprehensive and satisfactory definition. The test, broadly speaking, is whether the impugned provisions lay a direct and immediate burden on the movement of trade, commerce and intercourse or are intrinsically beneficial to and provide, in the ultimate analysis, facilities for better conduct of trade, commerce and intercourse. Observed Das, J., in Automobile Transport Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan.

***And, they must prohibit use of a war power***

David J. **Barron**\* **&** Martin S. **Lederman**\*\*, \*\* Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Harvard Law Review¶ January, 20**08**¶ 121 Harv. L. Rev. 689, ARTICLE: THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF AT THE LOWEST EBB - FRAMING THE PROBLEM, DOCTRINE, AND ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING, Lexis, jj

3. The Criminalization of Wartime Conduct. - **The potential for interbranch constitutional conflict** **over war powers is** arguably **made all the greater by a feature of some of the statutory restrictions on warmaking that Congress has enacted in recent decades: they** often **take the form of** criminal **prohibitions**. In previous armed conflicts, Presidents have occasionally avoided seemingly applicable statutory limits by means of creative - in some cases, perhaps even tendentious - statutory construction. n78 Such an executive branch legal strategy [\*716] forestalls the Category Three constitutional question by interpreting away the legislative constraint, **leaving it to Congress to respond by attempting to impose** (or reimpose) **the constraint - but this time with unmistakable clarity**. But while the Bush Administration has used this approach at times, as in its creative interpretations of the Torture Act and the relationship between FISA and the AUMF, n79 it has consistently supplemented such statutory construction with a strong constitutional objection (or it has insisted on narrow readings of statutes in order to avoid allegedly serious Article II questions).

***Restrictions on authority are distinct from conditions***

William **Conner 78**, former federal judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York United States District Court, S. D. New York, CORPORACION VENEZOLANA de FOMENTO v. VINTERO SALES, http://www.leagle.com/decision/19781560452FSupp1108\_11379

Plaintiff next contends that Merban was charged with notice of the restrictions on the authority of plaintiff's officers to execute the guarantees. **Properly interpreted,** **the "conditions" that had been imposed by plaintiff's** Board of Directors and by the Venezuelan Cabinet ***were not "restrictions"* or "limitations" *upon the authority* of** plaintiff's **agents but rather *conditions precedent to the granting of authority***. Essentially, then, plaintiff's argument is that Merban should have known that plaintiff's officers were not authorized to act except upon the fulfillment of the specified conditions.

***“On” requires direct relation***

**Dictionary.com**

(“On,” <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/on>)

**on**   [on, awn] Show IPA

preposition

1. so as to be or remain supported by or suspended from: Put your package down on the table; Hang your coat on the hook.

2. **so as to be attached to or unified with**: Hang the picture on the wall. Paste the label on the package.

1. ***Violation – the aff doesn’t directly prohibit a war powers authority***
2. ***Vote negative:***
3. ***Limits --- allowing the aff to only indirectly regulate war powers explodes the negative’s research burden and undermines preparedness for all debates***
4. ***Ground --- requiring the aff to prohibit a war power locks in core neg ground like drones good and detention good --- otherwise they only have to defend a rubberstamp mechanism***
5. ***Precision: only our interpretation defines “restrictions on authority”---that’s key to predictability and policy analysis***

**1NC XO CP**

***The Executive Branch of the United States federal government should direct that offensive cyber operations funded, conducted, and/or directed by Department of Defense be conducted pursuant to Title 10 United States Code.***

***This solves both advantages – ends convergence and confusion over Title 10 & 50 oversight duty while increasing transparency***

Micah **Zenko 13**, Douglas Dillon Fellow, April 2013, Council on Foreign Relations, Transferring CIA Drone Strikes to the Pentagon, <http://www.cfr.org/drones/transferring-cia-drone-strikes-pentagon/p30434>, jj

**The main obstacle to acknowledging the scope, legality, and oversight of U.S. targeted killings beyond traditional or "hot" battlefields is the division of lead executive authority between the** Joint Special Operations Command (**JSOC**)—**a subunit of the** Department of Defense **(DOD) Special Operations Command—and the** Central Intelligence Agency (**CIA**). In particular, the U.S. government cannot legally acknowledge covert actions undertaken by the CIA. **The failure to answer the growing demands for transparency increases the risk that U.S. drone strikes will be curtailed or eliminated due to mounting domestic or international pressure**. ***To take a meaningful first step toward greater transparency***, President Barack ***Obama should sign a directive that consolidates lead executive authority for planning and conducting nonbattlefield targeted killings under DOD.***

One Mission, Two Programs

**U.S. targeted killings are needlessly made complex and opaque by their division between two separate entities: JSOC and the CIA**. Although drone strikes carried out by the two organizations presumably target the same people, **the organizations have different authorities, policies, accountability mechanisms, and oversight**. Splitting the drone program between the JSOC and CIA is apparently intended to allow the plausible deniability of CIA strikes. **Strikes by the CIA are classified as Title 50 covert actions**, defined as "activities of the United States Government . . . where it is intended that the role . . . will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include traditional . . . military activities." As covert operations, the government cannot legally provide any information about how the CIA conducts targeted killings, **while JSOC operations are guided by Title 10 "armed forces" operations and a publicly available military doctrine**. Joint Publication 3-60, Joint Targeting, details steps in the joint targeting cycle, including the processes, responsibilities, and collateral damage estimations intended to reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties. **Unlike strikes carried out by the CIA, JSOC operations can be (and are) acknowledged by the U.S. government.**

**The different reporting requirements of JSOC and the CIA mean that congressional oversight of U.S. targeted killings is similarly murky**. **Sometimes oversight is duplicated among the committees; at other times, there is confusion over who is mandated to oversee which operations.** **CIA drone strikes are reported to the intelligence committees**. Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), has confirmed that the SSCI receives poststrike notifications, reviews video footage, and holds monthly meetings to "question every aspect of the program." Representative Mike Rogers (R-MI), chair of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), has said that he reviews both CIA and JSOC counterterrorism airstrikes. JSOC does not report to the HPSCI. **As of March 2012, all JSOC counterterrorism operations are reported quarterly to the armed services committees**. Meanwhile, the foreign relations committees—tasked with overseeing all U.S. foreign policy and counterterrorism strategies—have formally requested briefings on drone strikes that have been repeatedly denied by the White House. However, **oversight should not be limited to ensuring compliance with the law and preventing abuses, but rather expanded to ensure that policies are consistent with strategic objectives and aligned with other ongoing military and diplomatic activities. This can only be accomplished by DOD operations because the foreign relations committees cannot hold hearings on covert CIA drone strikes.**

Consolidating Executive Authority

In 2004, **the 9/11 Commission recommended that the "lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense Department" to avoid the "creation of redundant, overlapping capabilities and authorities in such sensitive work."** The recommendation was never seriously considered because the CIA wanted to retain its covert action authorities and, more important, it was generally believed such operations would remain a rarity. (At the time, there had been only one nonbattlefield targeted killing.) Nearly a decade later, there is increasing bipartisan consensus that consolidating lead executive authority for drone strikes would pave the way for broader strategic reforms, including declassifying the relevant legal memoranda, explicitly stating which international legal principles apply, and providing information to the public on existing procedures that prevent harm to civilians. During his February 2013 nomination hearing, CIA director John O. Brennan welcomed the transfer of targeted killings to the DOD: "The CIA should not be doing traditional military activities and operations."

The main objection to consolidating lead executive authority in DOD is that it would eliminate the possibility of deniability for U.S. covert operations. However, any diplomatic or public relations advantages from deniability that once existed are minimal or even nonexistent given the widely reported targeted killings in Pakistan and Yemen. For instance, because CIA drone strikes cannot be acknowledged, the United States has effectively ceded its strategic communications efforts to the Pakistani army and intelligence service, nongovernmental organizations, and the Taliban. Moreover, Pakistani and Yemeni militaries have often taken advantage of this communications vacuum by shifting the blame of civilian casualties caused by their own airstrikes (or others, like those reportedly conducted by Saudi Arabia in Yemen) to the U.S. government. This perpetuates and exacerbates animosity in civilian populations toward the United States. If the United States acknowledged its drone strikes and collateral damage—only possible under DOD Title 10 authorities—then it would not be held responsible for airstrikes conducted by other countries.

The CIA should, however, retain the ability it has had since 9/11 to conduct lethal covert actions in extremely rare circumstances, such as against immediate threats to the U.S. homeland or diplomatic outposts. Each would require a separate presidential finding, and should be fully and currently informed to the intelligence committees. Of the roughly 420 nonbattlefield targeted killings that the United States has conducted, very few would have met this criteria.

***The president should direct that U.S. drone strikes be conducted as DOD Title 10 operations***. **That decision would enhance U.S. national security in the following ways:**

**Improve the transparency and legitimacy of targeted killings, including what methods are used to prevent civilian harm.**

**Focus the finite resources of the CIA on its original core missions of intelligence collection, analysis, and early warning**. (There is no reason for the CIA to maintain a redundant fleet of armed drones, or to conduct military operations that are inherently better suited to JSOC, the premier specialized military organization. As "traditional military activities" under U.S. law, these belong under Title 10 operations.)

**Place all drone strikes under a single international legal framework, which would be clearly delineated for military operations and can therefore be articulated publicly.**

***Unify congressional oversight*** **of specific operations under the armed services committee, which would end the current situation whereby there is confusion over who has oversight responsibility.**

**Allow U.S. government officials to counter myths and misinformation about targeted killings at home and abroad by acknowledging responsibility for its own strikes.**

**Increase pressure on other states to be more transparent in their own conduct of military and paramilitary operations in nonbattlefield settings by establishing the precedent that the Obama administration claims can have a normative influence on how others use drones.**

**DA1**

***Farm bill will pass—Obama is pushing***

RYAN **BUCK, 11/12-13**, corn and soybean farmer in Goodhue County and is president of the Minnesota Corn Growers Association, Winona Daily News, Ryan Buck: Time to finally pass a new farm bill, <http://www.winonadailynews.com/news/opinion/columnists/other/article_a4478eda-4b11-11e3-b8c0-001a4bcf887a.html>, jj

Recently, however, ***there has been a renewed push to pass a farm bill***. And just as farmers are doing the work necessary to finish this year’s harvest, **it’s time for our elected leaders** in Washington **to** do the same and finally **get their jobs done by passing a farm bill**. It’s been more than two years since discussions on the next farm bill began. President **Obama himself** even **made passing a farm bill one of his top** three **priorities after the** recent government **shutdown** ended. As combines rolled throughout Minnesota fields last week, **a House and Senate conference committee met to try and reconcile differences in their respective versions of the farm bill**. Most of the debate will be about the nutrition title (food stamps) and how much or how little to cut from those programs. Sure, the farm bill might not generate the same type of political fervor and cable news yelling matches issues like the budget or national debt do, but that doesn’t mean people – especially farmers -- are indifferent about it.

***Fighting to defend his war power will sap Obama’s capital, trading off with rest of agenda***

**Kriner, 10** --- assistant professor of political science at Boston University

(Douglas L. Kriner, “After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War”, University of Chicago Press, Dec 1, 2010, page 68-69)

**While congressional support leaves the president’s reserve of political capital intact, *congressional criticism saps energy from other initiatives* on the home front by *forcing the president to expend energy and effort* defending his international agenda. Political capital spent shoring up support for a president’s foreign policies is capital that is unavailable for his future policy initiatives**. Moreover, any weakening in the president’s political clout may have immediate ramifications for his reelection prospects, as well as indirect consequences for congressional races.59 Indeed, Democratic efforts to tie congressional Republican incumbents to President George W. Bush and his war policies paid immediate political dividends in the 2006 midterms, particularly in states, districts, and counties that had suffered the highest casualty rates in the Iraq War. 60

**In addition to boding ill for the president’s perceived political capital and reputation, such partisan *losses* in Congress only further *imperil his programmatic agenda*, both international and domestic.** Scholars have long noted that President Lyndon **Johnson’s dream of a Great Society also perished in the rice paddies of Vietnam. Lacking** the requisite funds in a war-depleted treasury and **the political capital needed to sustain his legislative vision, Johnson gradually let his domestic goals slip away** as he hunkered down in an effort first to win and then to end the Vietnam War. In the same way, **many of** President **Bush**’s highest second-term domestic proprieties, such as Social Security and immigration reform, **failed perhaps in large part because the administration had to expend so much energy and effort waging a rear-guard action against congressional critics of the war in Iraq.**61

**When *making their cost-benefit calculations*, presidents surely consider these wider political costs of congressional opposition to their military policies.** If congressional opposition in the military arena stands to derail other elements of his agenda, all else being equal, the president will be more likely to judge the benefits of military action insufficient to its costs than if Congress stood behind him in the international arena.

***Obama’s political capital is key—the impact is food security***

Eva M. **Clayton, 11/5-13**, Former Congresswoman and former Assistant Director General of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, Huffington Post, Congressional and Presidential Leadership Needed for a Fair and Equitable Farm Bill, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eva-m-clayton/congressional-and-presidential_b_4221884.html>, jj

**Will** Congress and **the president demonstrate the leadership necessary to enact a strong, but fair Farm Bill that protects our agricultural economy and rural communities?** Will it provide a "safety net" for our most vulnerable citizens? Hopefully, the appointed Conferees will seek an opportunity to pass a strong Farm Bill that is fair and helpful to small and large farmers and will enable them to produce healthy and affordable food. The Farm Bill should empower our rural communities to develop and grow economically. Likewise, it must protect and provide food assistance to the millions of Americans in need. The leadership in the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate must instruct the Conferees to negotiate in the best interest of the American people. President ***Obama must be persistent in his leadership*** **by calling on Congress** to treat our most vulnerable citizens fairly, protect small and large farmers, and give rural communities an opportunity to grow economically. **Another extension of the Farm Bill once again is unacceptable. Farmers and businesses, which have been devastated by the legislative uncertainty, are unable to plan for the next planting season, and cannot do so until Congress acts and the president signs a bill**. **This delay has hampered assistance** for early generation farmers, minority farmers, and the rural small business sector who all suffer disproportionately without a signed bill. The Fair World Project reports that the majority of farm subsidies are paid to the most profitable companies in the U.S. and "ten percent of farms receive roughly 70 percent of all subsidies." This oversized government benefit reaped by large farms is a major factor in their ability to further expand, leading to increased concentration in the agriculture sector. These subsidies often drive land costs up and small farmers out. Yet, the conversation continues to be focused on cutting the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). This political gamesmanship puts us again at the crossroads of the "haves and have not's," while too many Americans depend on SNAP for it to be cut in the final bill. The House-passed Farm Bill cut $40 Billion over a ten-year period, mainly by cutting SNAP. The Tea Party and the extreme right wing of the Republican Party might see this as important part of its agenda to "cut spending," but such actions by the House have only resulted in ending 34 years of bipartisan cooperation on food and farm legislation. While Republicans in Congress continue to attack the Food Stamps program as an "easy place" to cut, they fail to recognize the needs of their own constituents and the contribution it provides our economy. Some fail to acknowledge, understand, or care that we had a recession and that Food Stamps were a part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. This bill, known as the 'Stimulus Package,' was scheduled to end November 1, 2013 and resulted in millions of people being dropped from the program. According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP), ending the Recovery Act will reduce benefits to approximately $1.40 per person per meal in 2014. Just think $1.40 per meal! Further, the vast majority of the 47 million SNAP recipients are children, seniors, and adults with disabilities. SNAP can be the bridge between living and survival, dignity and embarrassment. In fact over 900,000 veterans and 5,000 active duty service personnel currently receive food stamps. An example of this hardship was chronicled by the Food and Environment Reporting Network. Steven Johnson, a veteran of the war in Afghanistan, was medically discharged from the military and was unable to find work as a result of his disability. To further complicate matters, there was significant lag time between the end of his military pay and the beginning of his disability benefits. The typical wait time for this benefit is 394 days for active duty veterans, and longer for non-active duty personnel. That is 394 days without a pay check. 394 days without the capacity to feed yourself or your family. To bridge this gap, Johnson relied on food stamps to help feed his family. As veteran Johnson said, "Food Stamps were the last resort we had." This is what is at stake for the Confrees and this President. Unfortunately, there have been anecdotal comments of fraud where "people are trading food stamps for cash." While these instances must be addressed, but it is simply unfair to use these anecdotes to characterize how the law functions. The Department of Agriculture has reported that as few as 1.3 percent of all benefits, were traded at a discount for cash. I agree that fraud is unacceptable concerning all government programs and laws. However, it is amazing how offensive it is for Republicans to use assistance for the poor as a political piñata when fraud persists on Wall Street or among big businesses. The Fair World Project rightly notes that the "**Farm Bill is the single most important piece of legislation affecting the food we eat, the kinds of crops American farmers grow, and the environment in which they are grown. *The Farm Bill is at the very essence of our nation's food security***." This could not be more accurate. The Conferees must put our country first to find success in their negotiations. **A strong and fair Farm Bill will require** Congressional and **presidential leadership. *The fate of our nation's food security depends on it.***

***Extinction***

**Lugar 2k** Chairman of the Senator Foreign Relations Committee and Member/Former Chair of the Senate Agriculture Committee (Richard, a US Senator from Indiana, is Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and a member and former chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee. “calls for a new green revolution to combat global warming and reduce world instability,” pg online @ http://www.unep.org/OurPlanet/imgversn/143/lugar.html)

In a world confronted by global terrorism, turmoil in the Middle East, burgeoning nuclear threats and other crises, it is easy to lose sight of the long-range challenges. But we do so at our peril. One of the most daunting of them is meeting the world’s need for food and energy in this century. At stake is not only preventing starvation and saving the environment, but also world peace and security. History tells us that states may go to war over access to resources, and that poverty and famine have often bred fanaticism and terrorism. Working to feed the world will minimize factors that contribute to global instability and the proliferation of [***WMDs***] weapons of mass destruction. With the world population expected to grow from 6 billion people today to 9 billion by mid-century, the demand for affordable food will increase well beyond current international production levels. People in rapidly developing nations will have the means greatly to improve their standard of living and caloric intake. Inevitably, that means eating more meat. This will raise demand for feed grain at the same time that the growing world population will need vastly more basic food to eat. Complicating a solution to this problem is a dynamic that must be better understood in the West: developing countries often use limited arable land to expand cities to house their growing populations. As good land disappears, people destroy timber resources and even rainforests as they try to create more arable land to feed themselves. The long-term environmental consequences could be disastrous for the entire globe. Productivity revolution To meet the expected demand for food over the next 50 years, we in the United States will have to grow roughly three times more food on the land we have. That’s a tall order. My farm in Marion County, Indiana, for example, yields on average 8.3 to 8.6 tonnes of corn per hectare – typical for a farm in central Indiana. To triple our production by 2050, we will have to produce an annual average of 25 tonnes per hectare. Can we possibly boost output that much? Well, it’s been done before. Advances in the use of fertilizer and water, improved machinery and better tilling techniques combined to generate a threefold increase in yields since 1935 – on our farm back then, my dad produced 2.8 to 3 tonnes per hectare. Much US agriculture has seen similar increases. But of course there is no guarantee that we can achieve those results again. Given the urgency of expanding food production to meet world demand, we must invest much more in scientific research and target that money toward projects that promise to have significant national and global impact. For the United States, that will mean a major shift in the way we conduct and fund agricultural science. Fundamental research will generate the innovations that will be necessary to feed the world. The United States can take a leading position in a productivity revolution. And our success at increasing food production may play a decisive humanitarian role in the ***survival of*** billions of people and the health of ***our planet.***

**DA2**

***Tea party candidates will lose in 2014 now—governor races prove***

Susan **Page**, USA TODAY, **11-6-13**, Warning flags for the Tea Party and Democrats in 2014, <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/11/05/warning-flags-for-tea-party-and-democrats-in-2014-midterms/3444207/>, jj

WASHINGTON — **As voters in some states cast ballots** Tuesday, **warning signs flared for Tea Party forces** and the Democratic Party **about their prospects in the broader and more critical midterm elections precisely one year from now**. **The staying power of the conservative movement that burst onto the scene four years ago was called into question in this year's marquee contests**. **Tea Party nemesis Chris Christie swept to a landslide re-election** as governor in New Jersey, **a case study in how more moderate Republicans can carry even Democratic-leaning states**. **Tea Party favorite** Ken **Cuccinelli lost a closer race** against Democrat Terry McAuliffe for governor in Virginia, a contest establishment Republicans thought they could have won with a more mainstream candidate.

***Plan’s a wedge issue that causes Tea Party success in the midterms as rank-and-file GOP voters rebel against establishment candidates***

**Silver, ’13** [Nathaniel Read "Nate" Silver is an American statistician and writer who analyzes in-game baseball activity and elections. He is currently the editor-in-chief of ESPN's FiveThirtyEight blog and a Special Correspondent for ABC News. June 11, 2013, 538 – NYT, Domestic Surveillance Could Create a Divide in the 2016 Primaries, <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/11/domestic-surveillance-could-create-a-divide-in-the-2016-primaries/?_r=0>, jj]

**A poll** released on Monday by the Pew Research Center and The Washington Post **found a partisan shift in the way Americans view the** **N**ational **S**ecurity **A**gency’s domestic surveillance programs. In the survey, **slightly more Democrats than Republicans said they found it acceptable for the N.S.A. to track Americans’ phone records and e-mails if the goal is to prevent terrorism**. By comparison, when Pew Research asked a similar question in 2006, Republicans were about twice as likely as Democrats to support the N.S.A.’s activities. The poll is a reminder that **many Americans do not hold especially firm views on some issues and instead may adapt them depending on which party controls the executive branch**. When it comes to domestic surveillance, a considerable number of **Democrats seem willing to support actions under** President **Obama that they deemed unacceptable under** George W. **Bush, while some Republicans have shifted in the opposite direction**. **What may be just as significant is the way in which attitudes toward the *security state* could split voters and elected officials within each party — possibly creating a *wedge issue*** in both party primaries in 2016. **Politicians who are normally associated with being on the far left and the far right may find common cause with grass-roots voters** in their objection to domestic surveillance programs, ***fighting against a party establishment*** that is inclined to support them. Take, for example, the House’s vote in May 2011 to extend certain provisions of the Patriot Act — including the so-called library records provision that the government has used to defend the legality of sweeping searches of telephone and e-mail records. The bill passed with 250 yes votes in the House against 153 no votes, receiving more of its support from Republicans. (In the Senate, the bill passed, 72-23, winning majority support from both parties.) However, the House vote was not well described by a traditional left-right political spectrum. In the chart below, I’ve sorted the 403 members of the House who voted on the bill from left to right in order of their overall degree of liberalism or conservatism, as determined by the statistical system DW-Nominate. Members of the House who voted for the bill are represented with a yellow stripe in the chart, while those who voted against it are represented in black. The no votes are concentrated at the two ends of the spectrum. The 49 most liberal members of the House (all Democrats) who voted on the bill each voted against it. But so did 14 of the 21 Republicans deemed to be the most conservative by DW-Nominate. By contrast, 46 of the 50 most moderate Republicans voted for the Patriot Act extension, as did 38 of the 50 most moderate Democrats. Perhaps, you might object, a one-dimensional spectrum doesn’t do a very good job of capturing all the nuances of what it means to be liberal or conservative in America today. In considering the surveillance state, for example, ***Republicans must weigh their traditional support for aggressive antiterrorism policies against their distrust of government***, while Democrats must weigh their trust of Mr. Obama, who so far has been unapologetic for the N.S.A.’s actions, against their concern about civil liberties violations. Or more broadly, what about libertarians who take conservative views on economic policy but liberal views on social policy — or conservative Democrats who support the welfare state but not policies like gay marriage? Where are they represented on the spectrum? I am sympathetic toward these objections as a theoretical matter. Without making this too much of an editorial comment, I find the platforms of both parties to be lacking in philosophical cohesion — why, for example, should views on abortion have much to do with preferences on tax policy? But when it comes to American political parties and their representatives in Congress, partisanship tends to dominate all other considerations. National Journal has a different system for ranking members of Congress from liberal to conservative. It is somewhat less statistically rigorous than DW-Nominate’s system, but it does have the advantage of breaking votes down into three categories: those on economic, social and foreign policy. The correlations between the three policy areas are very high (specifically, they are about 0.9, where 1 would represent a perfect correlation). Members of Congress who take conservative views on economic policy tend almost always to take conservative views on social policy and foreign policy as well, while members who are liberal on one set of issues tend to cast liberal votes on almost all other issues. This does leave the question of how liberal and conservative policy stances are defined. (Support for gun rights, for example, is generally seen as socially conservative rather than socially liberal, even though socially liberal stances are often thought of as promoting the rights of individuals against communities or governments.) Nevertheless, for members of Congress today, a vote on any one issue is highly predictable based upon his votes on other issues. There are extremely few mavericks in Congress who vote on each issue on an independent and nonpartisan basis. DW-Nominate uses a different method to classify Congressional votes. Instead of assigning a subjective definition to each vote as liberal or conservative, it instead uses an automated process called optimal classification. The goal of this process is essentially to explain the highest number of Congressional votes based on a one-dimensional scale, regardless of the content of the legislation that comprises it. Whichever votes are not well explained by this first dimension are then explained by additional dimensions. The process is more intuitive than it might sound. For example, during the 1960s, Congressional votes on civil rights policy toward African-Americans were not very strongly correlated with votes on other types of political issues. (For instance, Southern Democrats were often staunchly opposed to civil rights for blacks while casting very liberal votes on the welfare state.) Thus, you needed at least two dimensions to describe Congressional voting patterns in a reasonably comprehensive way. In recent years, however, this has been much less of a problem: the one-dimensional spectrum explains about 95 percent of Congressional voting, and votes on economic, social and foreign policy are highly correlated. But a few votes still fall outside of the spectrum — the 2011 vote on the Patriot Act among them. If the second dimension no longer represents a distinction between economic and social policy, then what does it reflect? The authors of DW-Nominate are interpreting it to measure a distinction between what they call “establishment” members of Congress and “outsiders.” Here at FiveThirtyEight, I have sometimes used the same labels when describing the ideological space occupied by different candidates during the presidential primaries. Some candidates, like Mitt Romney, run as insider or establishment politicians, offering some iteration of what they say are tried-and-true solutions, while others run as insurgents or outsiders, submitting a more profound critique of politics as usual and claiming they will topple an unacceptable status quo. In general, those politicians who rate as insurgents or outsiders are on the wings of the liberal-conservative scale. The Tea Party, Occupy Wall Street and Ron Paul movements probably all fit into the outsider or insurgent category, for example, even though they inhabit vastly different spaces on the traditional left-right political spectrum. Conversely, moderates in both parties tend to score as establishment politicians. There aren’t very many “radical centrist” members of Congress who offer a pronounced critique of the status quo while also coming down somewhere in the middle on most policy issues. In the case of the Patriot Act vote, the establishment-outsider axis makes nearly as much difference as the liberal-conservative or Democratic-Republican scales. Among the so-called establishment members of the House who voted on the bill, 78 percent voted to extend the Patriot Act, while only 41 percent of the so-called outsiders did, according to DW-Nominate’s classifications. You can find similar patterns in certain votes on policy toward the financial sector — for example, during the various bailout votes that were cast toward the end of 2008. More recently, votes on the federal debt ceiling have taken on some of the same contours. What is the link between the financial votes and those on the surveillance state? In both cases, members of Congress were asked to trust the assertions of elites that significant harms would result if the bills were not enacted: terrorist acts in the event that the Patriot Act was not extended, or financial calamity in the event that the bailout was not passed or the debt ceiling was not raised. As a matter of practice (but not necessarily theory), convincing someone that a future crisis must be averted requires a higher level of persuasion than making the case for a policy that is claimed to ameliorate some extant problem. Members of Congress who are members of their party establishments might be more inclined to trust testimony from financial or national security elites, and therefore might have been easier to pitch on these bills. We should be careful about extrapolating the voting behavior of Congress to policy views among the general public. But as I have suggested, **the establishment-outsider divide can loom large** in presidential primaries. **Particularly within the Republican Party, rank-and-file voters have increasingly lukewarm views of the party leadership**. But Democrats will also face a primary after Mr. Obama’s tenure in office. Highly liberal, activist voters who might ordinarily be inclined to critique the status quo could face some awkward questions given that the status quo has featured a Democratic president. ***Debates on domestic surveillance could serve as proxy battles for these intraparty factions***. Senator Rand **Paul** of Kentucky, perhaps **along with other Republican candidates, could use his opposition to surveillance programs to help consolidate the support of libertarian and Tea Party voters**, at the risk of alienating national security conservatives. Democratic candidates who criticize the Patriot Act or the N.S.A.’s actions will be finding fault with policies that Mr. Obama has defended – and Mr. Obama will very likely remain quite popular among Democrats three years from now.

***This costs GOP moderates their seats and swings the election to the Tea Party***

**PDT 8/7-’13** [Pakistan Daily Times, Republican rift seeping into US foreign policy, <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013%5C08%5C07%5Cstory_7-8-2013_pg4_7>, jj]

**Old-guard Republicans like** Senator John **McCain hew to the traditional line that the exertion of American power is the primary force of good in a chaotic world**. They advocate supplying weapons to rebels in Syria, aiding Egypt despite the turmoil of the recent military coup, and using all tools at US disposal, including the surveillance of hundreds of millions of citizens, to keep America safe. **But insurgent conservatives, led by libertarian-leaning** Senators Rand **Paul and** Ted **Cruz, are challenging that orthodoxy, and their influence has become difficult to ignore**. A case in point came before the Senate late last week when Paul introduced a measure that would block $1.5 billion in aid to Egypt. His amendment was handily defeated, but not before heated debate between him and McCain over the role of the United States abroad. Notably voting with Paul and 11 other core conservatives was Mitch McConnell, the Senate’s top Republican. Together their vote bucked the position of AIPAC, the pro-Israel lobby that often finds Republican support in Washington. Earlier this year **McCain derisively called Cruz and Paul “wacko birds**” **on the Senate floor, citing their procedural opposition to virtually anything supported by** President Barack **Obama, including** the US budget, immigration reform, **drone use**, the national health law and foreign aid. “There may be more wacko birds in the Senate than is suspected,” Cruz, 42, sniped back at the 2008 Republican presidential nominee who is 34 years his senior. Cruz passed a big test last month in Iowa, where he was warmly received by several hundred evangelical pastors, a group that carries huge influence over the outcome of the first-in-the-nation primaries. **Paul became a hero** for many in March **when he launched a 13-hour filibuster in the Senate to demand the Obama administration clarify its position on** domestic use of **drones**. ***Political observers see a test brewing ahead of the*** presidential race in 2016 and even the ***mid-term elections in 2014***, **when voters will be confronted with what appears to be two divergent Republican strains**. Michael Steele, a former chairman of the Republican National Committee, said **recent ideological clashes have highlighted the “fracturing within the party.” “*The question is will the John McCain view prevail ultimately going into 2014, or will the Ted Cruz view prevail?”*** he told MSNBC. The establishment’s growing unease with the upstarts, Paul led the Republican field in a recent PPP poll on the 2016 race, is likely what fueled a very public war of words late last month between two likely Republican contenders for the White House. New Jersey Governor Chris Christie blasted Paul’s position on domestic surveillance, and House of Representatives lawmakers who nearly de-funded the intelligence program that scoops up telephone records on millions of Americans. “This strain of libertarianism that’s going through both parties right now and making big headlines, I think, is a very dangerous thought,” Christie said at a mayoral panel. Paul shot back that “spying without warrants is unconstitutional.” The two carried on their bickering for days until reaching an uneasy truce. Congressman Peter King, the New York Republican who has chaired the House Homeland Security Committee, warned that the ***Tea Party favorites could threaten GOP aspirations*** for taking back the White House, especially if they were running against former secretary of state Hillary Clinton. “I think she’s very strong on foreign policy, and I think that if we nominate someone from our isolationist wing of the party, she’ll destroy them,” King told ABC News, adding that their pushing of the national debate is “harmful to the country.” Conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer argued in his Friday column that the return of conservative isolationism “was utterly predictable.” **After years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, debate over countless drone strikes and the revelations of mass surveillance by the National Security Agency, “the natural tension between isolationist and internationalist tendencies has resurfaced**,” he wrote. Thomas Mann, a veteran congressional expert at the Brookings Institution, told AFP that while the Republican Party has largely accommodated the “economic libertarianism” of the Tea Party faithful in Congress,” **true isolationists have little support among Republicans in office. “With Americans weary of war, this could begin to change but it would presage a real crackup of the GOP,**” he said. afp

***Continued tea party influence blocks Obama’s climate agenda—electing moderates is key***

**Huq, ’13** [Saleemul Huq, irector, International Centre for Climate Change and Development, Independent University, Bangladesh, Dhaka, Responding to Climate Change, Comment: the US looks like it’s getting serious on climate change, <http://www.rtcc.org/2013/08/07/comment-the-us-looks-like-its-getting-serious-on-climate-change/>, jj]

**It is very clear that President Obama and his team of senior advisers all accept the scale of the climate change problem and recognise the US’s responsibilities.** This is in stark contrast to his predecessor President Bush who refused to take any significant action for eight years. **During** President **Obama’s first term** of office **he tried to bring Congress on board towards a national response to tackling climate change, which proved to be unsuccessful**. So in his second term he has decided to take whatever action he can by executive order and without requiring Congressional approval. While I have criticised his Climate Action Plan as being too little too late (when compared to the scale of the problem that has to be tackled), I must acknowledge that it is indeed a significant step forward compared to the past. State leverage The second important personality that is involved is the new Secretary of State (and former Senator) John Kerry who has a long and honourable history of engagement on this issue both at national as well as international levels. Unlike his predecessor, Hilary Clinton, he is very interested in this topic and is determined that the US plays a more positive role at the international level. He has already taken personal charge of US international relations on this topic. **The most difficult element of the political landscape in the US on the topic of climate change has always been, and continues to be, the Republican Party, who control the House of Representatives in Congress (and thus can, and do, block any attempts to bring legislation to tackle climate change**). **Within the Republican Party *the climate change denying tendency is led by the Tea Party* wing of the party and a handful of Congressmen and Senators. However, even here *there is a growing awareness amongst more sensible Republicans that they cannot continue to deny the reality of climate change***. **An example is the recent article** in the New York Times, jointly **authored by three former Republican heads of the** US Environmental Protection Agency (**USEPA), arguing for the Party to take sensible actions to tackle climate change.**

***Obama action on climate solves extinction***

Ashok **Khosla 9**, IUCN President, International Union for Conservation of Nature, A new President for the United States: We have a dream, 1-29-09, http://cms.iucn.org/news\_events/?uNewsID=2595

**A rejuvenated America, with a renewed purpose, commitment and energy to make its contribution once again towards a better world could well be the turning point that can reverse the current decline in** the state of the global economy, **the health of its life support systems** and the morale of people everywhere. This extraordinary change in regime brings with it the promise of a deep change in attitudes and aspirations of Americans, a change that will lead, hopefully, to new directions in their nation’s policies and action. In particular, **we can hope that from being a very reluctant partner in global discussions**, especially **on issues relating to environment and sustainable development, the *U*nited *S*tates will become an active leader in international efforts to address the** Millennial **threats now confronting civilization and even the *survival* of the human species**. **For the conservation of biodiversity, so essential to maintaining *life on Earth*, this promise of change has come not a moment too soon**. It would be a mistake to put all of our hopes on the shoulder of one young man, however capable he might be. The environmental challenges the world is facing cannot be addressed by one country, let alone by one man. At the same time, **an inspired US President** guided by competent people, **who does not shy away from exercising the true responsibilities and leadership his country is capable of, could do a lot to spur the international community into action**. To paraphrase one of his illustrious predecessors, “the world asks for action and action now.” What was true in President Roosevelt’s America 77 years ago is even more appropriate today. From IUCN’s perspective, the first signals are encouraging. The US has seriously begun to discuss constructive engagement in climate change debates. With Copenhagen a mere 11 months away, this commitment is long overdue and certainly very welcome. Many governments still worry that if they set tough standards to control carbon emissions, their industry and agriculture will become uncompetitive, a fear that leads to a foot-dragging “you go first” attitude that is blocking progress**. A positive intervention by the *U*nited *S*tates could provide the vital catalyst that moves the basis of the present negotiations beyond the narrowly defined national interests that lie at the heart of the current impasse**. **The logjam in international negotiations on climate change should not be difficult to break if the US were to lead the industrialized countries to agree that much of their wealth has been acquired at the expense of the environment** (in this case greenhouse gases emitted over the past two hundred years) **and that with the some of the benefits that this wealth has brought, comes the obligation to deal with the problems that have resulted as side-effects**. With equitable entitlement to the common resources of the planet, an agreement that is fair and acceptable to all nations should be easy enough to achieve. Caps on emissions and sharing of energy efficient technologies are simply in the interest of everyone, rich or poor. And both rich and poor must now be ready to adopt less destructive technologies – based on renewables, efficiency and sustainability – both as a goal with intrinsic merit and also as an example to others. But climate is not the only critical global environmental issue that this new administration will have to deal with. **Conservation of biodiversity, a crucial prerequisite for the *wellbeing of all humanity*, no less America, needs as much attention, and just as urgently**. **The United States’ self-interest in conserving living natural resources strongly converges with the global common good in every sphere: in the oceans, by arresting the precipitate decline of fish stocks and the alarming rise of acidification; on land, by regenerating the health of our soils, forests and rivers; and in the atmosphere by reducing the massive emission of pollutants from our wasteful industries, construction, agriculture and transport systems.**

**K**

***Their focus on subjective flashpoints of violence creates a stop-gap in thought which distracts us from attempts to solve the root cause of all violence - Capital***

**Zizek, ’08** (Slavoj, senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia and a professor at the European Graduate School, Violence, p. 1-4)

If there is a unifying thesis that runs through the bric-a-brac of reflections on violence that follow, it is that a similar paradox holds true for violence. At the forefront of our minds, the obvious signals of violence are acts of crime and ***terror, civil unrest, international conflict***. But we should learn to ***step back*,** to disentangle ourselves from the fascinating lure of this directly visible “subjective” violence, violence performed by a clearly identifiable agent. We need to perceive the contours of the background which generates such outbursts. A step back enables us to identify a violence that sustains our very efforts to fight violence and to promote tolerance. This is the starting point, perhaps even the axiom, of the present book: subjective violence is just the most visible portion of a triumvirate that also includes two objective kinds of violence. First, there is a “symbolic” violence embodied in language and its forms, what Heidegger would call “our house of being.” As we shall see later, this violence is not only at work in the obvious—and extensively studied—cases of incitement and of the relations of social domination reproduced in our habitual speech forms: there is a more fundamental form of violence still that pertains to language as such, to its imposition of a certain universe of meaning. Second, there is what I call “systemic” violence, or the often catastrophic consequences of the smooth functioning of our ***economic and political systems***. The catch is that subjective and objective violence ***cannot be perceived from the same standpoint*:** subjective violence is experienced as such against the background of a non-violent zero level. It is seen as a perturbation of the “normal,” peaceful state of things. However, objective violence is precisely the violence inherent to this “normal” state of things. Objective violence is invisible since it sustains the very zero-level standard against which we perceive something as subjectively violent. Systemic violence is thus something like the notorious “dark matter” of physics, the counterpart to an all-too- visible subjective violence. It may be invisible, but it has to be taken into account if one is to make sense of what otherwise seem to be “irrational” explosions of subjective violence. When the media bombard us with those “humanitarian crises” which seem constantly to pop up all over the world, one should always bear in mind that a particular crisis only explodes into media visibility as the result of a complex struggle. Properly humanitarian considerations as a rule play a less important role here than cultural, ideologico-political, and economic considerations. The cover story of Time magazine on 5 June 2006, for example, was “The Deadliest War in the World.” This offered detailed documentation on how around 4 million people died in the Democratic Republic of Congo as the result of political violence over the last decade. None of the usual humanitarian uproar followed, just a couple of readers’ letters—as if some kind of filtering mechanism blocked this news from achieving its full impact in our symbolic space. To put it cynically, Time picked the wrong victim in the struggle for hegemony in suffering. It should have stuck to the list of usual suspects: Muslim women and their plight, or the families of 9/11 victims and how they have coped with their losses. The Congo today has effectively re-emerged as a Conradean “heart of darkness.” No one dares to confront it head on. The death of a West Bank Palestinian child, not to mention an Israeli or an American, is mediatically worth thousands of times more than the death of a nameless Congolese. Do we need further proof that the humanitarian sense of urgency is mediated, indeed overdetermined, by clear political considerations? And what are these considerations? To answer this, we need to step back and take a look from a different position. When the U.S. media reproached the public in foreign countries for not displaying enough sympathy for the victims of the 9/11 attacks, one was tempted to answer them in the words Robespierre addressed to those who complained about the innocent victims of revolutionary terror: “Stop shaking the tyrant’s bloody robe in my face, or I will believe that you wish to put Rome in chains.”1 Instead of confronting violence directly, the present book casts six sideways glances. There are reasons for looking at the problem of violence awry. My underlying premise is that there is something inherently mystifying in a direct confrontation with it: the overpowering horror of violent acts and empathy with the victims inexorably function as a lure which ***prevents us from thinking***. A dispassionate conceptual development of the typology of violence must by definition ignore its traumatic impact. Yet there is a sense in which a cold analysis of violence somehow reproduces and participates in its horror. A distinction needs to be made, as well, between (factual) truth and truthfulness: what renders a report of a raped woman (or any other narrative of a trauma) truthful is its very factual unreliability, its confusion, its inconsistency. If the victim were able to report on her painful and humiliating experience in a clear manner, with all the data arranged in a consistent order, this very quality would make us suspicious of its truth. The problem here is part of the solution: the very factual deficiencies of the traumatised subject’s report on her experience bear witness to the truthfulness of her report, since they signal that the reported content “contaminated” the manner of reporting it. The same holds, of course, for the so-called unreliability of the verbal reports of Holocaust survivors: the witness able to offer a clear narrative of his camp experience would disqualify himself by virtue of that clarity.2 The only appropriate approach to my subject thus seems to be one which permits variations on violence kept at a distance out of respect towards its victims.

***It is not possible to solve any situation without solving them all - only a criticism which attacks the universality of capitalism can solve inevitable extinction***

**Zizek, ’89**

(Slavoj, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies, The Sublime Object of Ideology, page 3-4)

It is upon the unity of these two features that the Marxist notion of the revolution, of the revolutionary situation, is founded: **a situation of metaphorical condensation in which it finally becomes clear to the everyday consciousness that it is not possible to solve any particular ques­tion without *solving them all*** - that is, **without solving the fundamental question which embodies the antagonistic character of the social totality. In a 'normal', pre-revolutionary state of things, everybody is fighting his own particular battles** (workers are striking for better wages, feminists are fighting for the rights of women, democrats for political and social freedoms, ecologists against the exploitation of nature, participants in the peace movements against the danger of war, and so on). Marxists are using all their skill and adroimess of argument to convince the partici­pants in these particular struggles that the only real solution to their problem is to be found in the global revolution: **as long as social relations are dominated by Capital, there will always be sexism in relations between the sexes, there will always be a threat of global war, there will always be a danger that political and social freedoms will be suspended, nature itself will always remain an object of ruthless exploitation**. . . . **The global revolution will then abolish the basic social antagonism, enabling the formation of a transparent, rationally governed society.**

***Our alternative is to completely withdraw from the ideology of capital - this opens up the space for authentic politics***

**Johnston ’04** (Adrian, interdisciplinary research fellow in psychoanalysis at Emory, The Cynic’s Fetish: Slavoj Zizek and the Dynamics of Belief, Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society)

Perhaps the absence of a detailed political roadmap in Žižek’s recent writings isn’t a major shortcoming. Maybe, at least for the time being, the most important task is simply the negativity of the critical struggle, the effort to cure an intellectual constipation resulting from capitalist ideology and thereby to truly open up the space for imagining authentic alternatives to the prevailing state of the situation. Another definition of materialism offered by Žižek is that it amounts to accepting the internal inherence of what fantasmatically appears as an external deadlock or hindrance ( Žižek, 2001d, pp 22–23) (with fantasy itself being defined as the false externalization of something within the subject, namely, the illusory projection of an inner obstacle, Žižek, 2000a, p 16). From this perspective, seeing through ideological fantasies by learning how to think again outside the confines of current restrictions has, in and of itself, the potential to operate as a form of real revolutionary practice (rather than remaining merely an instance of negative/critical intellectual reflection). Why is this the case? Recalling the analysis of commodity fetishism, the social efficacy of money as the universal medium of exchange (and the entire political economy grounded upon it) ultimately relies upon nothing more than a kind of ‘‘magic,’’ that is, the belief in money’s social efficacy by those using it in the processes of exchange. Since the value of currency is, at bottom, reducible to the belief that it has the value attributed to it (and that everyone believes that everyone else believes this as well), derailing capitalism by destroying its essential financial substance is, in a certain respect, as easy as dissolving the mere belief in this substance’s powers. The ‘‘external’’ obstacle of the capitalist system exists exclusively on the condition that subjects, whether consciously or unconsciously, ‘‘internally’’ believe in it – capitalism’s life-blood, money, is simply a fetishistic crystallization of a belief in others’ belief in the socio-performative force emanating from this same material. And yet, this point of capitalism’s frail vulnerability is simultaneously the source of its enormous strength: its vampiric symbiosis with individual human desire, and the fact that the late-capitalist cynic’s fetishism enables the disavowal of his/her de facto belief in capitalism, makes it highly unlikely that people can simply be persuaded to stop believing and start thinking (especially since, as Žižek claims, many of these people are convinced that they already have ceased believing). Or, the more disquieting possibility to entertain is that some people today, even if one succeeds in exposing them to the underlying logic of their position, might respond in a manner resembling that of the Judas-like character Cypher in the film The Matrix (Cypher opts to embrace enslavement by illusion rather than cope with the discomfort of dwelling in the ‘‘desert of the real’’): faced with the choice between living the capitalist lie or wrestling with certain unpleasant truths, many individuals might very well deliberately decide to accept what they know full well to be a false pseudo-reality, a deceptively comforting fiction (‘‘Capitalist commodity fetishism or the truth? I choose fetishism’’).

**Adv 1**

**1NC—Offense**

***Current rules are sufficient to check OCO abuse – additional restraints will undermine our flexibility to fight against asymmetrical warfare***

Jessica **Feil, 2012**, Editor-in-Chief, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, “Cyberwar and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Using New Technologies, from Espionage to Action,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Fall, pp. LN, KEL

UAVs present the same challenge when entering a state. The United States is not engaged in a conflict by traditional definition, but the United States still views the UAV campaigns to be legal. n198 As long as a covert cyberattack conforms to the rigors of international humanitarian principles, the United States can justify such actions. **When covert cyber actions distinguish between civilians and military and do not cause unnecessary suffering, they can be justified in the same manner as traditional covert tools**. n199 **Recourse by targeted states against these actions should be classified by the covert nature of the attack, not the cyber methods.** VI. Conclusion Technology is advancing faster than ever and states around the world have taken notice. n200 **When any new technology emerges, many may rush to seek a new regulation scheme.** But the "evolutionary flexibility" of the laws of armed conflict is specifically designed to [\*544] allow for developments in technology. n201 These laws exist for the protection of civilians during conflict--a goal and mission that does not change with the methods of warfare employed. n202 **A rush to impose new legal obligations just because the technology is new is counterproductive**. n203 The principles of humanitarian protection remain immutable and the laws of war continue to protect, despite advancing technologies. **New technologies present new opportunities to meet the pressing asymmetric challenges of modern warfare**. n204 The specter of cyberwar looms large. Yet with exploration of the technology and law, cyberwar does not need to strike fear into the hearts of average citizens. As with centuries of conflict, from the battering ram to the warship to computer network attack, the modern laws of war will serve as a practical framework for national security.

***Statutory limitations on war powers increase the costs of presidential action – causes over-deterrence which means OCO’s are never used***

**Pevehouse & Howell ’08**, Jon C. Pevehouse, Professor – Poli Sci – UW-Madison, William G. Howell, Sydney Stein Professor in American Politics in the Harris School, a professor in the Department of Political Science and the College, and a co-director of the Program on Political Institutions. While Dangers Gather : Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers. Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press, 2008. p 9-10. <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/wayne/Doc?id=10478247&ppg=12>, jj

Strong informational advantages coupled with the unique ability to act unilaterally in the international arena make the president, by Paul Peterson’s account, “the most potent political force in the making of foreign policy,” while Congress remains “a secondary political player.” 21 There is no escaping this fact. The primary questions that this book intends to answer are not whether congressional power effectively matches presidential power, or whether Congress has met its constitutional obligations over foreign policy making. On both of these fronts, answers obviously assume the negative. Rather, the interesting questions are uncovered when we examine those interbranch struggles that persist, when we try to determine whether Congress, in any material fashion, constrains the presidential use of force. Congress, Still Relevant **Endowed with powers of unilateral action and immense informational advantages, why should the president worry about Congress?** **What can its members really do that has any bearing on his assessments of the potential risks and rewards of military action? A fair amount**, we think. Its actions will not convince every president, every time, to change course. But **through** both **legislative enactments** and public appeals, **Congress can increase the likely costs, financial and otherwise, of a planned military venture**. **The bills Congress introduces, the resolutions it passes, the hearings it holds, and the public declarations its members make can establish legal constraints on presidential war powers and increase the political costs of battlefield failures**. In this section, we summarize past congressional efforts to influence presidential decision making through both legislative processes and public appeals: We then offer some lessons about how these activities shape the larger politics that precede military action.

**1NC – No Cyber Terror**

***( ) No cyberterror***

**Knake ’10** (Robert K, international affairs fellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations studying cyber war, 2-16, CFR, “Cyberterrorism Hype v. Fact” <http://www.cfr.org/terrorism-and-technology/cyberterrorism-hype-v-fact/p21434>, jj)

While the United States' critical infrastructure, from the electric grid to the financial sector, is vulnerable to attack through cyberspace, **al-Qaeda lacks the capability and motivation to exploit these vulnerabilities**. **To penetrate, map, and damage the networks that control the industrial base requires a large team of experienced hackers, a lot of time, and advanced infrastructure. Only a handful of groups, mostly nation state actors, possess this level of capability, and al-Qaeda is not one of them**. **In the last ten years**, according to the National Counterterrorism Center's Worldwide Incidents Tracking Database, **there have been 63,192 incidents of terrorism. Not one was an incident of cyberterrorism.** As [Irving Lachow](http://www.ndu.edu/IRMC/ia/lachow.html) at NDU has pointed out, **the jihadist community heavily relied on one London-based hacker known by the moniker Irhabi 007, who at best had moderate ability. Since his arrest in 2005, indications are that al-Qaeda's cybercapabilities have only eroded**. While continuing to rely on petty crime to fund many plots, **al-Qaeda has been unable to capitalize on the explosion of cybercrime, lacking the technical capability to do so.** **For al-Qaeda to do any real damage with cyberattacks, it would need to make a multi-year investment in developing offensive cybercapabilities and would need a secure facility and advance test bed from which to do it. Understanding the control software for an electric grid is not a widely available skill. It is one thing to find a way to hack into a network and quite another to know what to do once you're inside.**

**1NC – No Cyber War (Russia/China)**

***( ) States won’t cyber-attack us***

**CSIS ’10** (Center for Strategic and International Studies ,“The Cyber War Has Not Begun,”March)

Weak attribution could allow an opponent to attack covertly, but this would require accepting the risk that the Americans would not eventually determine the source of the attack. **Uncertainty about how much the Americans know and how good they are at attribution makes attackers cautious. Fear of retaliation, including kinetic retaliation, for attacking the American homeland is a threshold that no nation has been willing to cross**. ***Call this deterrence if you like*. Even in a conflict –** with China over Taiwan or Russia over Georgia **– our opponents would be constrained in launching some kinds of cyber attack. Attacks on civilian targets in the continental United States could trigger a much stronger reaction than attacks on military targets and deployed forces**. Moving from deployed forces in theater to civilian targets in the homeland risks unmanageable escalation. **These risks and uncertainties create implicit thresholds in cyber conflict that nations have so far observed.** Just as with missiles and aircraft, our nation-state opponents have the ability to strike the United States using cyber attacks, but **they have chosen not to do so because of the risk of retaliation. While there are parallels to other weapons systems, cyber attack is unlikely to be decisive against a determined opponent**.

**\*\*1NC – Heg Defense**

***Heg high and sustainable now – overwhelming power --- no reason more OCO’s key***

**Tufts Daily** 2-23-**11** (Prashanth Parameswaran, master's candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, writer for the New Strait Times, Strait Times and China Post, and former CSIS intern, “America is not in decline” <http://www.tuftsdaily.com/op-ed/prashanth-parameswaran-the-asianist-1.2478466>, jj)

I don't. **Very little about "American decline" is real or new. Similar predictions of U.S. decline have surfaced every decade or so** since Washington rebuilt the international system after World War II, from the aftermath of Sputnik in the 1960s to the economic distress of the 1980s. Foreign Policy is also hardly the only peddler of the latest declinism fetish. Everyone from [Newsweek's](http://newsweek.com) Fareed Zakaria to former Singaporean diplomat Kishore Mahbubani to American intelligence agencies themselves has parroted a version of it. But every myth has a grain of truth. In this case it's the fact that — God forbid — other powers are rising. Goldman Sachs says China will overtake the U.S. economy by 2027 and that the BRIC nations (**Brazil, Russia, India and China) will emerge as major world players**. But **so what? Other powers have been rising for decades**. **Yet,** to take one statistic**, the American economy in 2004 was the same size relative to the world's total GDP as it was in 1975 — 20 percent.** The real and more useful questions about decline are therefore not who is growing and by how much, but whether emerging powers can dent American power sufficiently and whether the United States will lose the key advantages that have sustained it as the world's sole superpower. **For all the fretting, the *U*nited *S*tates,** as Mr. Rachman himself admits, **remains the leader across the board. U.S. military power is still unmatched and vastly technologically superior to any other nation. Military spending is almost as much as the rest of the world combined. The American economy dominates futuristic industries like biotechnology and nanotechnology with a potent combination of technological prowess and entrepreneurial flair.** According to China's own Jiao Tong University's rankings, **17 of the world's top 20 universities are American. Millions still flock here to pursue the American Dream, while America's melting pot of cultures bodes well for its exceptional innovative capacity**. Provided the United States continues to encourage immigration and starts controlling its debt, **there is little reason to believe that such a *resilient colossus* will see its vast advantages perish**. **There are also few signs of a "global multipolar system" emerging anytime soon.** Despite doomsday realist predictions, **no country has attempted to balance Washington's hegemony since 1991**. And while the future rise of Asian powers may boost the case for eventual American decline, the truth is that **each of the United States' potential balancers also faces significant challenges going forward. For China, it is the growing disparity between its coastal and inland areas, its physical isolation and the risk that it will get old before it gets rich. For India and the European Union, the challenge will be to painfully negotiate the divergent interests of states in a noisy democratic system. As for Iran, Russia and Venezuela, they are flexing their muscles as proud spoilers, not global powers. It is also quite unlikely that these states will soon form a coalition to confront the United States, given their own divergent interests.** Even China and Russia compete ferociously in Central Asia today. Don't get me wrong. I don't believe we've reached Francis Fukuyama's "end of history," particularly with the slowing of democracy's progress during the last decade. Nor do I think the United States will be able to dominate and dictate terms to others all the time in the future. Still, **I just don't see the irreversible decline in U.S. power and the rise of a new world order that many seem to reflexively accept.**

***Heg collapse doesn’t cause global nuclear war – conflicts would be small and managable***

Richard **Haas** (president of the Council on Foreign Relations, former director of policy planning for the Department of State, former vice president and director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, the Sol M. Linowitz visiting professor of international studies at Hamilton College, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a lecturer in public policy at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, and a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies) April **2008** “Ask the Expert: What Comes After Unipolarity?” http://www.cfr.org/publication/16063/ask\_the\_expert.html

Does a non polar world increase or reduce the chances of another world war? Will nuclear deterrence continue to prevent a large scale conflict? Sivananda Rajaram, UK Richard Haass: I believe the chance of a world war, i.e., one involving the major powers of the day, is remote and likely to stay that way. This reflects more than anything else the absence of disputes or goals that could lead to such a conflict. Nuclear deterrence might be a contributing factor in the sense that no conceivable dispute among the major powers would justify any use of nuclear weapons, but again, I believe the fundamental reason great power relations are relatively good is that all hold a stake in sustaining an international order that supports trade and financial flows and avoids large-scale conflict. The danger in a nonpolar world is not global conflict as we feared during the Cold War but smaller but still highly costly conflicts involving terrorist groups, militias, rogue states, etc.

***Transition is smooth – decline in power causes global cooperation***

Carla **Norrlof** (an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto) **2010** “America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation” p. 50

Keohane and Snidal’s predictions – that the waning of American power did not have to jeopardize cooperation – were in this context reassuring. As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, Keohane explained the persistence of cooperation in terms of states’ continued demand for regimes.40 Snidal demonstrated that collective action depends as much on the hegemon’s size, as it does on the size of other actors in the international system. By paying attention to the size of all Great Powers, not just the hegemon, Snidal opened up the possibility that a more symmetrical distribution of power might enhance the prospects for the provision of public goods, thus offering a potential explanation for the otherwise puzzling persistence of cooperation in the 1980s despite America’s relative decline. The likelihood for cooperation increases with American decline because the hegemon can no longer singlehandedly provide the good as it declines, so smaller states have to chip in for the good to be provided. If one were to use Snidal’s production function in the revised model (i.e., by plugging the numbers from his production function into the revised model), the waning hegemon continues to be taken advantage of. While Snidal was modeling a theory he did not believe in, these distributional implications haunt the literature and cast decline as inescapable and continuous

**1NC – No Impact**

***No impact---we could recover from a cyberattack***

**Lewis ’03** (James, senior fellow and director of the Technology and Public Policy Program at CSIS, Summer, Knowledge, Technology & Policy, “Cyber terror: Missing in Action” springer link, jj)

In general, **analyses of cyber terrorism or cyber warfare greatly exaggerate the vulnerability of infrastructure and nations to the effects of computer network attacks. The hypothetical vulnerability of various infrastructures--water systems, air traffic control, electrical grids--is routinely overstated in cyber attack scenarios. Very few, if any, of these infrastructures are dependent on computer networks (and the Internet) for their operation**. Cyber attack scenarios also seem to assume a high degree of passivity or incompetence in their victims. The history of both terror and conventional military attacks shows that **people in the United States and elsewhere are resilient and inventive in response to attacks and show a surprising, even heroic, capability to resist and restore.**

**A2: Cyberterror 🡪 Econ Collapse**

***Cyber terror doesn’t cause economic collapse***

**Knake ’10** (Robert K, international affairs fellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations studying cyber war, 2-16, CFR, “Cyberterrorism Hype v. Fact” <http://www.cfr.org/terrorism-and-technology/cyberterrorism-hype-v-fact/p21434>, jj)

For less than $500,000 and using box cutters as the primary weapon, al-Qaeda was able to create a military response that to date has cost between $1 trillion to $2.5 trillion**. What kind of results could al-Qaeda get from hacking? If al-Qaeda were able to cause a power blackout by hacking SCADA systems, they couldn't do much better than the tree limbs that caused the 2003 Northeast Blackout. That event put 50 million people in the United States and Canada in the dark for up to four days. Economists place the cost of that event between $4.5 and $10 billion, a blip in the $14.2 trillion economy**. One thing the United States has learned about the cost of disruption to the economy is that **disruption causes pain that is short lived and minimal. A two-day snow storm doesn't eliminate two days of economic activity, it only delays it. The same holds true for port closures and other disruptive activities.**

**Econ**

***Even massive economic decline has zero chance of war***

Robert **Jervis 11**, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be **a worsening of** the **current economic difficulties,** which **could** itself **produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies**. **While these dangers are real**, ***it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough*** **to lead** the **members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence** has proceeded to the point where it **could not be reversed** – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. **Rather it is that** ***even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited***, **it is** **hard to see how** without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict **leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or** even **attacking others**. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? **While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis**, **an optimist could reply (correctly**, in my view) **that the very fact that we have seen** ***such a sharp economic down-turn*** **without** ***anyone*** **suggesting that force** of arms **is the solution** **shows that** ***even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict***, ***it will not make war thinkable.***

***Resilience makes the impact impossible***

**Zakaria 2009** – PhD in political science from Harvard, editor of Newsweek International, former managing editor of Foreign Affairs (12/12, Fareed, Newsweek, “The Secrets of Stability”, http://www.newsweek.com/id/226425/page/2, WEA)

**One year ago, the world seemed** as if **it might be coming apart**. The global financial system, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world, was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of globalization—about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology—were being called into question. **Faith in the American model had collapsed**. The financial industry had crumbled. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s.

Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression."

Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets.

Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization.

**One year later, how much has the world really changed?** Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). **Some** regional **banks have gone bust**. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. **The predictions of** economic and political **collapse have not materialized** at all.

A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' " says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?"

This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies.

It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit.

Beyond all this, though, I believe **there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse** in the last year. **It is the same reason that we weathered** the stock-market crash of **1987**, the recession of **1992**, the Asian crisis of **1997**, the Russian default of **1998**, and the tech-bubble collapse of **2000**. **The** current global economic **system is inherently** **more resilient than we think. The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other** and each historical in nature.

**The first is** the spread of **great-power peace. Since the end of the Cold War, the world's major powers have not competed with each other in geomilitary terms.** There have been some political tensions, but measured by historical standards the globe today is stunningly free of friction between the mightiest nations. **This** lack of conflict **is extremely rare in history**. You would have to go back at least 175 years, if not 400, to find any prolonged period like the one we are living in. The number of people who have died as a result of wars, civil conflicts, and terrorism over the last 30 years has declined sharply (despite what you might think on the basis of overhyped fears about terrorism). And no wonder—three decades ago, the Soviet Union was still funding militias, governments, and guerrillas in dozens of countries around the world. And the United States was backing the other side in every one of those places. That **clash of superpower proxies caused enormous bloodshed and instability**: recall that 3 million people died in Indochina alone during the 1970s. **Nothing like that is happening today**.

Peace is like oxygen, Harvard's Joseph Nye has written. When you don't have it, it's all you can think about, but when you do, you don't appreciate your good fortune. **Peace allows for the possibility of a stable economic life and trade**. The peace that flowed from the end of the Cold War had a much larger effect because it was accompanied by the discrediting of socialism. The world was left with a sole superpower but also a single workable economic model—capitalism—albeit with many variants from Sweden to Hong Kong.

**This consensus enabled the expansion of the global economy**; in fact, it created for the first time a single world economy in which almost all countries across the globe were participants. **That means everyone is invested in the same system.** Today, while the nations of Eastern Europe might face an economic crisis, **no one is suggesting that they abandon free-market capitalism and return to communism.** In fact, around the world you see the opposite: even in the midst of this downturn, there have been few successful electoral appeals for a turn to socialism or a rejection of the current framework of political economy. Center-right parties have instead prospered in recent elections throughout the West.

**The second force for stability is the victory**—after a decades-long struggle—**over** the cancer of **inflation**. Thirty-five years ago, much of the world was plagued by high inflation, with deep social and political consequences. **Severe inflation can be far more disruptive than a recession, because while recessions rob you of better jobs** and wages that you might have had in the future, **inflation robs you of what you have now by destroying your saving**s. **In** many countries in **the 1970s, hyperinflation led to the destruction of the middle class, which was the background condition for** many of the **political dramas** of the era—coups in Latin America, the suspension of democracy in India, the overthrow of the shah in Iran. But then in 1979, the tide began to turn when Paul Volcker took over the U.S. Federal Reserve and waged war against inflation. Over two decades, central banks managed to decisively beat down the beast. At this point, only one country in the world suffers from -hyperinflation: Zimbabwe. Low inflation allows people, businesses, and governments to plan for the future, a key precondition for stability.

Political and economic stability have each reinforced the other. And **the third force** that has underpinned the resilience of the global system **is technological connectivity.** Globalization has always existed in a sense in the modern world, but until recently its contours were mostly limited to trade: countries made goods and sold them abroad. **Today the information revolution has created a much more deeply connected global system.**

Managers in Arkansas can work with suppliers in Beijing on a real-time basis. The production of almost every complex manufactured product now involves input from a dozen countries in a tight global supply chain. And the consequences of connectivity go well beyond economics. Women in rural India have learned through satellite television about the independence of women in more modern countries. Citizens in Iran have used cell phones and the Internet to connect to their well-wishers beyond their borders. Globalization today is fundamentally about knowledge being dispersed across our world.

This diffusion of knowledge may actually be the most important reason for the stability of the current system. **The majority of the world's nations have learned some basic lessons about political well-being and wealth creation**. They have taken advantage of the opportunities provided by peace, low inflation, and technology to plug in to the global system. And they have seen the indisputable results. **Despite all the turmoil of the past year, it's important to remember that more people have been lifted out of poverty over the last two decades than in the preceding 10**. Clear-thinking citizens around the world are determined not to lose these gains by falling for some ideological chimera, or searching for a worker's utopia. They are even cautious about the appeals of hypernationalism and war. Most have been there, done that. And they know the price.

**Adv 2**

**1NC---EU Co-Op**

***The NSA scandal destroys their solvency, but it also proves no impact to EU backlash against counter-terror and relations resilient***

**Quinn 10/29-’13** [Adam Quinn is senior lecturer in international politics at the University of Birmingham in Birmingham, Britain. He is leader of a seminar series on The Future of American power from the Economic and Social Research Council, from which Mr. Quinn also receives funding. October 29, 2013, Christian Science Monitor, NSA revelations threaten Obama's soft power and America's global influence, <http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2013/1029/NSA-revelations-threaten-Obama-s-soft-power-and-America-s-global-influence>, jj]

Now the rolling scandal over National Security Agency (**NSA**) surveillance, triggered by the mass leak of secrets by Edward Snowden, **has entered another phase of intensity, this time centered on Europe**. **Revelations** **that the US tapped the phone of** German Chancellor Angela **Merkel,** operated numerous “listening posts” on European soil, and sucked up vast quantities of communications data from millions of citizens across Europe **have broken** in the press. Public expressions of displeasure have been forthcoming, including a European Union statement. Taken together, these vignettes of public dissension will be enough to make many ask the question: **Is the US losing its influence even over its allies?** Is this just a tricky moment for a particular president, or is it a harbinger of a broader trend? Global shift First, the necessary caveats: ***Enduring alliance relationships resemble long marriages, in that the mere presence of moments of strain, or even audible arguments, cannot be taken as evidence of imminent separation***. **Looking back over the longer-term history of America’s relations with its allies, episodes such as the Vietnam War, the “Euromissile” crisis of the 1980s, and the controversial interventions in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s demonstrate that sharp differences of opinion and conflicting priorities are no radical, new state of affairs**. And ***however unhappy they may be with their recent treatment, it is not obvious that countries such as Germany, France, or Saudi Arabia have anywhere to go if they did decide the time had come to tout for alternative alliance partners***. **It is not entirely clear how European annoyance might manifest in ways that have practical importance**. It is true the Europeans have it in their power to threaten progress on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership process, but **it is not clear that such an action would harm the US more than Europe itself**. In short, ***even if they are disgruntled, necessity may ultimately prove a sufficient force to help them get over it.***

**Detention Alt Caus**

***Detention & drones takes out the aff***

Judy **Dempsey 10/28**, nonresident senior associate at Carnegie Europe and editor in chief of Strategic Europe, OCTOBER 28, 2013, Carnegie, The End of the Post-1945 Transatlantic Relationship, <http://www.carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=53438>, jj

**The administration of former president George W. Bush prosecuted that war relentlessly, sending soldiers into Afghanistan and Iraq while also involving some of America’s European allies in renditions**. And while the administration of President Barack Obama brought home American troops from Iraq and is withdrawing from Afghanistan, **the war on terror continues**. **It is the ideological nature of this struggle that is straining relations between Europeans and Americans.** On the face of it, **the first obvious problem is the continuing existence of the Guantánamo Bay detention camp. That has sullied America’s reputation for decency and upholding civil liberties, as Obama himself has acknowledged. Yet in spite of many declarations of goodwill, he has not yet closed down the camp.**

**The use of drones is another issue that causes strife between the United States and its European allies**. **The massive and nontransparent use of drones** against suspected terrorists, which is supported by over 65 percent of Americans, **has damaged Washington’s reputation** in Pakistan and Yemen, but also **in Europe**.

**No impact**

***Relations are resilient---mutual interests***

**Calomgaert 08** (Michael, Visiting Scholar at the Brookings Inst., expert on European economic integration, the European Union, Italy, transatlantic relations and Western Europe and former senior foreign service officer specializing in economic affairs. “Europe-U.S. Relations,”June 25, http://www.loccidentale.it/articolo/europe-u.s.+relations)

In conclusion, we continue to discover a truism: **there exists a commonality of values, interests, and objectives between the United States and the EU.  Each needs the other despite periodic perceived disadvantages from the relationship.** It is not an ideal relationship, but **it is effective and mutually beneficial**.  Although that is not a unanimous view - there are people on both sides who perceive a threat from the other - we must recognize the need to thrash out our differences and come up with the most effective policies.To end on a bipartisan note, I quote the Clinton Administration – “we are not clones, we are cousins,” said Madeleine Albright – and the Bush Administration – Nicholas **Burns**, who **referred to our “long-term marriage with no possibility of separation or divorce.”**  Both come to the same conclusion.

***Alt caus and no impact---debt crisis makes the EU a useless partner***

**Flanagan et al ’11** (Stephen J, senior vice president and Henry A. Kissinger Chair, Guy Ben-Ari, deputy director and fellow with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group, David Berteau, senior adviser and director of the CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group, T.J. Ciplottei, Heather A Conley, Joachim Hofbauer, Roy Levy, Alessandero Scheffler, May, CSIS, “A Diminishing Transatlantic Partnership?” <http://csis.org/files/publication/110427_Flanagan_FinancialCrisis_web.pdf>, jj)

This report explores the impact of the global financial crisis, and the subsequent European recession and sovereign debt crisis, on Europe’s ability to sustain its valuable contributions to this partnership. It concludes that **as the ongoing economic and political crisis deepens, Europe is likely to be less capable, less willing, and less interested partner in those endeavors**. **Measures of this shift in burden sharing are already evident.** As NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Ramsusen noted at the 2011 Munich Security Conference, **a decade ago the United States accounted for just under 50 percent of total Alliance defense spending. Today the U.S. share is closer to 75 percent and this transatlantic imbalance of defense effort and capabilities is projected to grow**.2 As the Secretary General also observed, **some in Europe are not alarmed by this shift**, because they are content with the EU’s status as the leading provider of official humanitarian and development assistance. **But this de facto division of labor that is emerging, where the United States takes on hard-power missions and Europe opts for soft-power tasks, will have a corrosive effect on the transatlantic relationship**. Moreover, the analysis in this report suggests that **the economic crisis is likely to result in a significant contraction of European soft power, as official development assistance budgets come under pressure from governmental austerity measures.**

**I/L**

***Their Tehran times is inevitable—doesn’t make a causal claim about EU relations and Iran prolif***

**Iran**

***No impact***

**Walt 11/30** (Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University., 11/30/12, “The mother of all worst-case assumptions about Iran”, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/11/30/the\_mother\_of\_all\_worst\_case\_assumptions\_about\_iran)

The debate on Iran and its nuclear program does little credit to the U.S. foreign policy community, because much of it rests on **dubious assumptions that do not stand up to even casual scrutiny**. Lots of ink, pixels, and air-time has been devoted to discussing whether Iran truly wants a bomb, how close it might be to getting one, how well sanctions are working, whether the mullahs in charge are "rational," and whether a new diplomatic initiative is advisable. Similarly, journalists, politicians and policy wonks spend endless hours asking if and when Israel might attack and whether the United States should help. But we hardly ever ask ourselves if this issue is being blown wildly out of proportion. At bottom, the whole debate on Iran rests on the assumption that Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon would be an event of shattering geopolitical significance: On a par with Hitler's rise to power in Germany in 1933, the fall of France in 1940, the Sino-Soviet split, or the breakup of the former Soviet Union. In this spirit, Henry Kissinger recently argued that a latent Iranian capability (that is, the capacity to obtain a bomb fairly quickly) would have fearsome consequences all by itself. Even if Iran stopped short of some red line, Kissinger claims this would: 1) cause "uncontrollable military nuclear proliferation throughout [the] region," 2) "lead many of Iran's neighbors to reorient their political alignment toward Tehran" 3) "submerge the reformist tendencies in the Arab Spring," and 4) deliver a "potentially fatal blow" to hopes for reducing global nuclear arsenals. Wow. And that's just if Iran has nuclear potential and not even an actual weapon! It follows that the United States must either persuade them to give up most of their enrichment capacity or go to war to destroy it. Yet this "mother of all assumptions" is simply asserted and rarely examined. The obvious question to ask is this: did prior acts of nuclear proliferation have the same fearsome consequences that Iran hawks now forecast? **The answer is no**. In fact, **the spread of nuclear weapons has had remarkably little impact on the basic nature of world politics and the ranking of major powers**. The main effect of the nuclear revolution has been to induce greater caution in the behavior of both those who possessed the bomb and anyone who had to deal with a nuclear-armed adversary. Proliferation has not transformed weak states into influential global actors, has not given nuclear-armed states the ability to blackmail their neighbors or force them to kowtow, **and it has not triggered far-reaching regional arms races**. In short, fears that an Iranian bomb would transform regional or global politics **have been greatly exaggerated**; one might even say that **they are just a lot of hooey**. Consider the historical record. Did the world turn on its axis when the mighty Soviet Union tested its first bomb in 1949? Although alarmist documents like NSC-68 warned of a vast increase in Soviet influence and aggressiveness, Soviet nuclear development simply reinforced the caution that both superpowers were already displaying towards each other. The United States already saw the USSR as an enemy, and the basic principles of containment were already in place. NATO was being formed before the Soviet test and Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe was already a fait accompli. Having sole possession of the bomb hadn't enabled Truman to simply dictate to Stalin, and getting the bomb didn't enable Stalin or his successors to blackmail any of their neighbors or key U.S. allies. It certainly didn't lead any countries to "reorient their political alignment toward Moscow." Nikita Khrushchev's subsequent missile rattling merely strengthened the cohesion of NATO and other U.S.-led alliances, and we now know that much of his bluster was intended to conceal Soviet strategic inferiority. Having a large nuclear arsenal didn't stop the anti-commnist uprisings in East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or Poland, and didn't allow the Soviet Union to win in Afghanistan. Nor did it prevent the USSR from eventually collapsing entirely. Did British and French acquisition of nuclear weapons slow their decline as great powers? Not in the slightest. Having the force de frappe may have made De Gaulle feel better about French prestige and having their own deterrent made both states less dependent on America's security umbrella, but it didn't give either state a louder voice in world affairs or win them new influence anywhere. And you might recall that Britain couldn't get Argentina to give back the Falklands by issuing nuclear threats -- even though Argentina had no bomb of its own and no nuclear guarantee -- they had to go retake the islands with conventional forces. Did China's detonation of a bomb in 1964 suddenly make them a superpower? Hardly. China remained a minor actor on the world stage until it adopted market principles, and its rising global influence is due to three decades of economic growth, not a pile of nukes. And by the way, did getting a bomb enable Mao Zedong--a cruel megalomaniac who launched the disastrous Great Leap Forward in 1957 and the destructive Cultural Revolution in the 1960s -- to start threatening and blackmailing his neighbors? Nope. In fact, China's foreign policy behavior after 1964 was generally quite restrained. What about Israel? Does Israel's nuclear arsenal allow it to coerce its neighbors or impose its will on Hezbollah or the Palestinians? No. Israel uses its conventional military superiority to try to do these things, not its nuclear arsenal. Indeed, Israel's bomb didn't even prevent Egypt and Syria from attacking it in October 1973, although it did help convince them to limit their aims to regaining the territory they had lost in 1967. It is also worth noting that Israel's nuclear program did not trigger a rapid arms race either. Although states like Iraq and Libya did establish their own WMD programs after Israel got the bomb, none of their nuclear efforts moved very rapidly or made it across the finish line. But wait, there's more. The white government in South Africa eventually produced a handful of bombs, but nobody noticed and apartheid ended anyway. Then the new government gave up its nuclear arsenal to much acclaim. If anything, South Africa was more secure without an arsenal than it was before. What about India and Pakistan? India's "peaceful nuclear explosion" in 1974 didn't turn it into a global superpower, and its only real effect was to spur Pakistan -- which was already an avowed rival -- to get one too. And it's worth noting that there hasn't been a large-scale war between the two countries since, despite considerable grievances on both sides and occasional skirmishes and other provocations. Finally, North Korea is as annoying and weird as it has always been, but getting nuclear weapons didn't transform it from an economic basket case into a mighty regional power and didn't make it more inclined to misbehave. In fact, what is most remarkable about North Korea's nuclear program **is how little impact it has had on its neighbors**. States like Japan and South Korea could go nuclear very quickly if they wanted to, but neither has done so in the six years since North Korea's first nuclear test. In short, **both theory and history teach us that getting a nuclear weapon has less impact on a country's power and influence than many believe**, **and the slow spread of nuclear weapons has only modest effects on global and regional politics**. Nuclear weapons are good for deterring direct attacks on one's homeland, and they induce greater caution in the minds of national leaders of all kinds. **What they don't do is turn weak states into great powers, they are useless as tools of blackmail, and they cost a lot of money**. They also lead other states to worry more about one's intentions and to band together for self-protection. For these reasons, **most potential nuclear states have concluded that getting the bomb isn't worth it**. But a few states-and usually those who are worried about being attacked-decide to go ahead. The good news is that when they do, it **has remarkably little impact on world affairs**. For some strange reason, however, the U.S. national security community seems to think that both logic and all this prior history does not apply to Iran. They forget that similarly dire warnings were uttered before many of these others states got the bomb, **yet none of these fearsome forecasts took place.** Ironically, by repeatedly offering doom-and-gloom scenarios about the vast geopolitical consequences of an Iranian bomb, they may be strengthening the hands of Iranian hardliners who might be interested in actually obtaining a working weapon. After all, if getting a bomb would give Iran all the influence that Kissinger and others fear, why wouldn't Tehran want one?

***Iran prolif doesn’t cause extinction***

**Young 12** (Michael Young is opinion editor of The Daily Star newspaper in Beirut, 8/9/2012, "Misjudging Iran's rationality is a recipe for more calamity", www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/misjudging-irans-rationality-is-a-recipe-for-more-calamity#full)

Amid signs that negotiations between the international community and Iran over the Iranian nuclear programme are going nowhere, the debate as to whether the Islamic Republic should actually be permitted to develop nuclear weapons has resurfaced. In a recent article in Foreign Affairs magazine, the American scholar Kenneth Waltz maintained that, far from destabilising the Middle East, an Iran armed with nuclear weapons would do precisely the contrary. Israel's nuclear monopoly in the region, not Iran's pursuit of a nuclear capability, is what has fuelled instability, he writes, because power begs to be balanced. "What is surprising about the Israeli case is that it has taken so long for a potential balancer to emerge," Mr Waltz notes. Many will disagree with Mr Waltz's assessment, and have long provided arguments disputing approaches such as his. And yet most of those opinions are unpersuasive, no matter how distasteful is the prospect of Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons. The first contention, and the one most often echoed by Israeli and American politicians, is that Iran's regime is fundamentally irrational. The premise is that mad mullahs rule in Tehran, and that their religious zeal may push them to press the button if it means that they can destroy Israel. Notions of deterrence, therefore, are irrelevant, because an eschatological ideology has taken over. This line is useful in public statements, but if there is one thing that Israelis and Americans have learnt over the years, it is that Iran's leaders are eminently rational in the pursuit of their interests, and in the protection of their authority. A nuclear attack on Israel would be matched by more severe Israeli, and probably American, nuclear retaliation against Iran. Moreover, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians would be killed in a first strike against Israel. No Iranian leader will sign off on such a scheme, religion or no religion. Iran has also shown exceptional rationality in working through proxies and in building up alliances far and wide to compensate for its shortcomings internationally. The Islamic Republic has, of course, transformed Lebanon's Hizbollah into a powerful military force on Israel's border; it has bolstered Muqtada Al Sadr in Iraq, and even rival groups to his; and it has extended its reach to Latin America and Africa. These patient endeavours are hardly those of a rabid regime hell bent on provoking Armageddon in the Middle East. A second argument is that, while Iran may not deploy nuclear weapons against Israeli directly, it might encourage proxies or terrorist groups to do so. But as Mr Waltz writes, two things work against this: it would be easy to discover Iranian responsibility, and countries that develop nuclear weapons generally retain tight control over their arsenals. "After all, building a bomb is costly and dangerous. It would make little sense to transfer the product of that investment to parties that cannot be trusted or managed," he believes. Iran's intention to closely monitor its weapons was plain during the Lebanon war of 2006, when the Iranians apparently gave final approval for use of, or even operated, Hizbollah's most advanced systems. But that begs another question, namely whether an entirely trusted Hizbollah might receive nuclear weapons from Iran. Such an alternative cannot be discounted, but it is improbable. First, Israel would not hesitate to engage in a ferocious pre-emptive strike against Lebanon, perhaps even initiating a ground war to prevent such an outcome. And Lebanese society, with many Shia among them, recognising the potentially disastrous consequences of a nuclear-armed Hizbollah, would angrily challenge the party, undermining the national unity required to give a nuclear deterrent its value. A third basis for opposing a nuclear Iran is that under a nuclear cover it would become more aggressive throughout the region. That's possible, but it's not clear that there is a correlation between aggressiveness and nuclear weapons. Without such weapons, Iran has already been exceptionally assertive in the region in the past years. But would it be more so with a bomb? Mr Waltz believes that history shows otherwise. "[W]hen countries acquire the bomb, they feel increasingly vulnerable and become acutely aware that their nuclear weapons make them a potential target in the eyes of major powers." The merits of the discussion are imposed by the stark reality that Iran, if it does indeed pursue nuclear weapons, will not be dissuaded from doing so whatever the political and economic pressures, assuming there is no change of regime. Nor will a military attack, Israeli or American, necessarily halt Iran's nuclear programme, even if it delays it for a time. On the other hand, the cost of bombing Iran would be exceptionally high in the region and beyond, dividing the international community more than it already is. Strangely, the United States has not factored Syria into its approach to the Iranian nuclear question. The Iranians will lose a great deal if the regime of President Bashar Al Assad falls. Yet few officials in Washington have asked whether an Iran minus its Syrian partner - with Hizbollah therefore isolated in an increasingly hostile environment and wary of waging war - would still constitute a major threat in the Levant, with or without nuclear weapons. In other words the situation in Syria may prove as decisive, if not more so, in defining Iranian influence than whether it has weapons it can never use. Iran has done enough to worry its neighbours. However, careful and multifaceted political containment is the best way to oppose Tehran, not a military onslaught that will unite Iranians, strengthen their leaders, spawn great and small wars, and ultimately alter little. An Iran with the bomb is thoroughly undesirable, but it is not the existential calamity it has been made out to be.

**1NC – Nuclear Terror FL**

***Status quo solves --- Al Qaeda is weak and doesn’t threaten the U.S.***

**Roth 8-2-’13**, Kenneth Roth is executive director of Human Rights Watch, 8-2-’13, Washington Post, The war against al-Qaeda is over, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-war-against-al-qaeda-is-over/2013/08/02/3887af74-f975-11e2-b018-5b8251f0c56e_story.html>, jj

The al-Qaeda threat to the United States, while still real, no longer meets those standards. **At most, al-Qaeda these days can mount sporadic, isolated attacks, carried out by autonomous or loosely affiliated cells**. **Some attacks may cause considerable loss of life, but they are nothing like the military operations that define an armed conflict under international law**.¶ Obama himself has said that **the core of al-Qaeda** — the original enterprise now based, if anywhere, in the tribal areas of northwestern Pakistan — ***has been “decimated***.” **Its affiliates, such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, are more robust armed groups but have limited capacity to pro­ject their violence beyond their regions**.¶ These affiliates are significant actors in Yemen and northern Africa, but **it is far from clear that they pose a threat to the United States greater than, for example, Mexican drug cartels or international ­organized-crime networks — organizations for which few would characterize U.S. containment efforts as “war**.” That the United States continues to deploy military force against al-Qaeda is not enough to qualify that effort as an armed conflict, because if it were, a government could justify the summary killing of “combatants” simply by using its armed forces to do so.

***No risk of nuclear or WMD terror***

John **Mueller and** Mark G. **Stewart 12**, Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute AND Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle, "The Terrorism Delusion," Summer, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1, politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller//absisfin.pdf, jj

Over the course of time, such essentially **delusionary thinking has been internalized and institutionalized** in a great many ways. For example, **an extrapolation of delusionary proportions is evident in the common observation that, because terrorists were able, mostly by thuggish means, to crash airplanes into buildings, they might therefore be able to construct a nuclear bomb**. Brian Jenkins has run an internet search to discover how often variants of the term “al-Qaida” appeared within ten words of “nuclear.” There were only seven hits in 1999 and eleven in 2000, but the number soared to 1,742 in 2001 and to 2,931 in 2002.47

By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates was assuring a congressional committee that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is “the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear.” 48

Few of the sleepless, it seems, found much solace in the fact that **an al-Qaida computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group’s budget for research on *w*eapons of *m*ass *d*estruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was $2,000** to $4,000.49

**In the wake of the killing of** Osama **bin Laden, officials now have many more al-Qaida computers, and nothing in their content appears to suggest that the group had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-technology facility to fabricate a bomb**. **This is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew—all while attracting no attention from outsiders**.50

**If the miscreants in the American cases have been unable to create and set off even the simplest conventional bombs, it stands to reason that none of them were very close to creating, or having anything to do with, nuclear weapons—or for that matter biological, radiological, or chemical ones.** In fact, with perhaps one exception, **none seems to have even dreamed of the prospect**; and the exception is José Padilla (case 2), who apparently mused at one point about creating a dirty bomb—a device that would disperse radiation—or even possibly an atomic one. His idea about isotope separation was to put uranium into a **pail and then to make himself into a human centrifuge by swinging the pail around in great arcs.51 Even if a weapon were made abroad and then brought into the United States, its detonation would require individuals in-country with the capacity to receive and handle the complicated weapons and then to set them off. Thus far, the talent pool appears, to put mildly, very thin**. There is delusion, as well, in the legal expansion of the concept of “weapons of mass destruction.” The concept had once been taken as a synonym for nuclear weapons or was meant to include nuclear weapons as well as weapons yet to be developed that might have similar destructive capacity. After the Cold War, it was expanded to embrace chemical, biological, and radiological weapons even though those weapons for the most part are incapable of committing destruction that could reasonably be considered “massive,” particularly in comparison with nuclear ones. 52

And as explicitly rendered into U.S. law, the term was extended even further to include bombs of any kind, grenades, and mines; rockets having a propellant charge of more than four ounces; missiles having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than onequarter ounce; and projectile-spewing weapons that have a barrel with a bore more than a half inch in diameter.53

It turns out then that the “shot heard round the world” by revolutionary war muskets was the firing of a WMD, that Francis Scott Key was exultantly, if innocently, witnessing a WMD attack in

1814; and that Iraq was full of WMD when the United States invaded in 2003—and still is, just like virtually every other country in the world.

After September 11, the delusional—or at least preposterous—expanded definition of WMD has been routinely applied in the United States. **Many of those arrested for terrorism have been charged with planning to use “weapons of mass destruction” even though they were working, at most, on small explosives or contemplating planting a hand grenade in a trash bin.**

# 2NC

**K**

**2nc/1nr -Cap K overview-**

***Capitalism makes war inevitable --- reject their scholarship***

Aris I. **Trantidis**, 20**09**, MPhil/PhD student, London School of Economics and Political Science, War, democracy and capitalism, <http://www.psa.ac.uk/2009/pps/Trantidis.pdf>, jj

**Causal spuriousness**, however, **may run the other way around**. It can be said that democracies foster open private market economies which in turn allow the development of economic ties between nations. It can be argued that the constructive effect of international trade and of economic interdependency rests on democratic governments pursuing policies of relatively open markets, as these have been perceived as maximising welfare. At the same time, they abstain from developing closer ties with those authoritarian regimes which democracies perceive as aggressive and threatening. Understandably there is less trade with autocratic countries which are not ‘free market’ and ‘open to trade’ economies.

**Capitalist peace theory** and democratic peace theory share the common position that both they both **have been in disagreement with key realist assumptions**. Robert Keohane (1983) summarises three assumptions, which form part of the ‘hard core’ of the realist approach: 1) states are the most important actors in the international system, 2) international relations can be analyzed as if states are unitary rational actors, and 3) states calculate their interests in terms of power, as an end in itself or as a necessary means to other ends. In the realist archetype, peace reflects a balance of power between nations or alliances, or result from the presence of a hegemonic power, whose power and resources enable it to impose its ‘peace’ on its own terms. Rosato has argued about post-World War II peace that ‘one potential explanation is that democratic peace is in fact an imperial peace based on American power. The democratic peace is essentially a postWorld War II phenomenon restricted to the Americas and Western Europe. The United States has been the dominant power in both these regions since World War II and has placed an overriding emphasis on regional peace (2003:599). **C**apitalist **p**eace **t**heory **has** also **been undermined by numerous historical observations prior to American hegemony of capitalist countries fighting bitter wars despite their trade links during the 19th century up to the second half of the 20th century**. ***The debate is far from closed.***

The departure of democratic peace theory and capitalist peace theory from realism is that they both look inside the state for institutions, norms and actors which largely define foreign policy. They also explore links between domestic actors across nations on the basis of shared values, shared norms, and common interests. In this sense, they are both closer to methodological individualism.

According to methodological individualism groups become actors when organised and acting under shared perceptions of common interest. Actors are motivated for collective action upon calculation of expected costs and benefits.

Before taking state preferences as given, it is thus useful to trace the preferences of these groups and the ways they are shaping the domestic process of decisionmaking. Implicitly or explicitly democratic peace theory and capitalist peace theory point to two levels of analysis related to the formation of national preferences: processes embedded within states, and linkages between states as well as underlying transnational connections between social and economic groups across states.

Opposite to the capitalist peace theory stands the Marxist view of war. The assumption of Marxist arguments is that **capitalist states represent the interests of the ruling class, the bourgeoisie, which wants to extend the exploitation of the labour class at home and abroad**. According to conventional Marxist thought, **war is the product of competition among capitalist states and their bourgeois elites for the expansion and intensification of exploitation of labour and material resources.**

**The concept of imperialism describes the** alleged **tendency of great powers to launch wars in order to territorially expand the exploitation of resources, human and material, beyond the boundaries of the nation state**. To explain why war between democracies had been rarer post World War II, Marxist accounts have come close to the realist argument and put forward concepts such as ‘empire’, ‘hegemony’ and ‘dependency’ (Negri and Hardt, 2000). Next to the realist emphasis on power, **Marxist accounts have put emphasis on hierarchical relations linking the advanced economies with the rest of the world by means of economic power as much as by the use of force.**

There are a number of challenges the four schools of thought have confronted.

**Capitalist peace theory has been asked to address the fact that civil war and domestic war-like conflicts are *more frequent* today, and occur among groups or regions closely tied in economic exchange**. For instance, **elected leaderships in Yugoslavia fought a series of bitter wars by fuelling nationalism in their ethnic groups despite the fact that they had resided in ethnically mixed and economically interdependent constituencies**. Democratic peace theory has to address why civil wars have often occurred between groups whose leaderships had enjoyed high degree of legitimacy, and were often elected. In particular, leaderships in ethnic civil war have been able to mobilise domestic groups into violent acts and conflict. On other occasions, ethnic and social divisions have been contained within the institutions in place, or have been tackled by peaceful institutional change establishing a modus vivendi that has secured peace and stability. **This is raising doubts on whether class or ethnic divisions trigger conflict irrespective of how the preferences of these groups have been shaped by the opportunity sets available to them.**

**\*\*\*2nc – Link/Perm Debate**

***The 1AC identifies a subjective manifestation of violence and attempts to address it with the usual methods of liberal governmentality—this routinizes exceptional violence and prevents broader systemic analysis***

**Saas ‘12** (William O. Saas, Pennsylvania State University, “Critique of Charismatic Violence,” symploke, Vol. 20, Nos. 1-2 (2012), p. 65-67, Project Muse, Access Provided by Wayne State University at 02/28/13) [m leap]

**The September 11**, 2001 **terrorist attacks** in New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia **precipitated the development of a *new lexicon for exceptional violence***. **“Enemy combatant,” “indefinite detention,” “enhanced interrogation,” “high value targets,” “black sites,” “extraordinary rendition,” “predator drones,” and “hellfire missiles” are but a small representative sample of the novel phraseology invented in the wake of the attacks to describe the bellicose praxis of the U.S.’ “war on terror.”** Though this novel lexicon early comprised the avant-garde of the Bush administration’s rhetoric of retaliation, **little work was required to integrate the language and its attendant practices into the more *overt grammar of “preemptive” warfare*** codified in the United States National Security Strategy of 2002 (colloquially, the “Bush Doctrine”) and executed in Iraq. One decade and several extralegal “limited kinetic operations” later, President Barack ***Obama***—**who campaigned on a pledge to dissolve the regime of secrecy and coercion represented by Bush-era “counterterrorism”**—***routinely supplements the new war lexicon* with ever more expansive interpretations of executive prerogative**. Continuation of the most far-reaching of these new extensions of power—the until recently secret drone-assassination program that resulted in the targeted killing of a U.S. citizen in Yemen in September of 2011—is all but assured now by the confluence of enhanced measures against transparency and bi-partisan political approval (Wilson and Cohen 2012). Meanwhile, the next stage in the evolution of “post-9/11” warfare threatens to be of the “preventive” kind with Iran (Greenwald 2012).¶ The new war lexicon is one symptom of the unprecedented expansion of executive power following the attacks of September 11. **Such executive power was accompanied immediately by the development of a new vehicle for its manufacture and delivery, a sprawling executive bureaucracy** that, early on, Vice President Dick Cheney referred to as the “dark side” of the new war and which journalists Dana Priest and William Arkin have called “Top Secret America” (2010). According to Priest and Arkin, Top Secret America comprises some 1,271 government agencies and 1,931 private companies that individually work on “programs related to counterterrorism, homeland security and intelligence in about 10,000 locations across the United States.” This massive bureaucracy is populated by a workforce of over 854,000 civil servants with top-secret security clearances, inclusive of janitorial staff. Its agency locations occupy a total of over 17 million square feet of U.S. real estate, in spaces ranging from a three billion dollar techno-fortress in Maryland to commercial suites in small-town industrial malls across the suburban U.S. Its activities include domestic wiretapping, international e-mail monitoring, and myriad other forms of cultivating “intelligence” under the aegis of “national security.” The whole of this sprawling apparatus—close to one million personnel, Yottabytes1 [1One Yottabyte equals roughly “a septillion (1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000) pages of text.” The National Security Agency estimates that it will need Yottabytes of server space by 2015 (Bamford 2009).] of server space for storing endless streams of domestic and international “intelligence,” and the paramilitary technologies required to mobilize these elements against those deemed the enemy—falls within the administrative purview of the executive branch of U.S. government.¶ ***Hidden in plain sight: a sprawling bureaucracy designed to justify and deliver military violence—clothed in the new war lexicon—to the world***. **How might one critique this massive network of violence that has become so enmeshed in our contemporary geo-socio-political reality? Is there any hope for reversing the expansion of executive violence in the current political climate**, in which the President enjoys minimal resistance to his most egregious uses of violence? **How does exceptional violence become routine? Answers to these broad and difficult questions, derived as they are from the disorientingly vast and hyper-accelerated retrenchment of our current political situation, are best won through the broad strokes of** **what** Slavoj **Žižek calls** ***“systemic” critique*. For Žižek,** **looking squarely at interpersonal or subjective violences (e.g., *torture, drone strikes*), drawn as we may be by their gruesome and immediate appeal, distorts the critic’s broader field of vision.** ***For a fuller picture, one must pull one’s critical focus back several steps to reveal the deep, objective structures that undergird the spectacular manifestations of everyday, subjective violence*** (Žižek 2008, 1-2). Immediately, however, one confronts the limit question of Žižek’s mandate: how does one productively draw the boundaries of a system without too severely dampening the force of objective critique?¶ For practical purposes, this essay leaves off discussion of neoliberal economic domination, vital as it may be to a full accounting for the U.S.’ latest and most desperate expressions of state solvency. Offered instead is a critique of the organizational violence of the U.S.’ executive bureaucratic apparatus, an apparatus called into being by charismatic decree, made banal through quasi-legal codification, and guaranteed by popular disinterest. Considered also will be the peculiar, if also somewhat inevitable, continuity of the apparatus’s growth under the Obama administration. Candidate Obama’s pledge to transparency may now seem an example of truly “mere” campaign rhetoric, but the extent to which his presidency has exceeded that of George W. Bush in terms of exceptional violence bears some attention. **The central difference between the presidencies of Bush and Obama**, I suggest, **has been the discursive means by which their respective administrations have cultivated an image of charismatic rule**.¶ This essay proceeds in three steps. I begin by outlining a recent case of subjective violence, the assassination of Anwar al-Awlaki by drone strike, and then pull back to reveal the structural support for that strike. In the second section, taking Max Weber as my guide, I argue that **bureaucratic domination is both the derivative speech act of, and the logic that underwrites, the violence of the modern liberal-democratic state. Under stable conditions, the state bureaucracy facilitates the hegemony of abstract, depersonalized, and mechanical Enlightenment legal-rationalism—what Foucault called *liberal “governmentality*”**—by maintaining relative equilibrium between liberal autonomy and distributive justice among the citizenry. In other words, **modern bureaucracy effectively mediates the two poles, “liberty” and “equality,” that comprise** what political theorists have called ***the liberal-democratic paradox*** (Mouffe 2009). **When an event is framed as threatening to strip the state of its rhetorical power, however, the bureaucratic apparatus becomes the crucible for** what I identify in the third section, with additional help from Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben, as ***charismatic domination, or the rhetorical exploitation of a vulnerable population by a sovereign decider***. **Under these conditions**, **the state bureaucracy becomes a kind of “vanishing mediator”** (Jameson 1988, 25-27), **its energies redirected for exclusive and singular usage by the exceptional-charismatic sovereign**. ***In the perpetual state of exception, the democratic paradox becomes subordinate to sovereign claims to total and indivisible control over the legitimate use of force.*** I conclude by outlining what I perceive as the best chances for stemming the growth of the national security bureaucracy, namely, relentless publicity.

***Plan action short-circuits alt solvency - action necessarily precludes thinking***

**Zizek, ’09** (Slavoj, senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, professor at the European Graduate School, and total BAMF, First as Tragedy, Then as Farce, p. 10-11, bgm)

**At the height of the meltdown**, Joseph **Stiglitz wrote that, in spite of the growing consensus** among economists **that any bail-out** based on US Treasury Henry Paulson’s plan **would not work, “it is impossible for politicians to do nothing in such a crisis. So we** may **have to pray that an agreement crafted with the toxic mix of special interests, misguided economics, and right-wing ideologies that produced the crisis can somehow produce a rescue plan that works—or whose failure doesn’t do too much damage.” He is correct, since markets are effectively based on beliefs (even beliefs about other people’s beliefs), so when the media worry about “how the markets will react”** to the bail-out, **it is a question not only about its real consequences, but about the *belief* of the markets in the plan’s efficacy.** This is why the bail-out might work even if it is economically wrong-headed. **The pressure “to do something” here is like the superstitious compulsion to make some gesture when we are observing a process over which we have no real influence. Are not out acts often such gestures? The old saying, “Don’t just talk, do something!” is one of the most stupid things one can say**, even measured by the low standards of common sense. Perhaps, rather, **the problem lately has been that we have been doing too much, such as intervening in nature, destroying the environment**, and so forth… **Perhaps it is time to step back, think and *say* the right thing.** True, we often talk about something instead of doing it; but sometimes **we also do things in order to avoid talking and thinking about them. Such as throwing $700 billion at a problem instead of reflecting on how it arose in the first place.**

**CP**

**2NC A2: Agent CP’s Bad**

***1) Agent CP’s are a pre-req to war powers education --- executive action is key to test the desirability of statutory or judicial restrictions***

**Crocker ’12**, Thomas P. Crocker, Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. J.D. Yale Law School; Ph.D. Vanderbilt University, July, 2012¶ Connecticut Law Review¶ 44 Conn. L. Rev. 1511, COMMENTARY: NATIONAL SECURITY: RESPONSE: Who Decides on Liberty?, Lexis, jj

**Whether approached as a matter of executive discretion, judicial role, or individual rights, questions about security are never far removed from questions about liberty**. **We are often told that there must be a tradeoff between liberty and security**. As Jeremy Waldron described the ubiquity of this claim, "[t]alk of a liberty/security balance has become so common that many view it as just an ambient feature of our political environment." n1 Despite the purported equivalence of these two values, this tradeoff is seldom framed with reasons to adopt policies that make us more insecure to achieve the benefits of greater freedom. If "it has become part of the drinking water in this country that there has been a trade off of liberty for security," n2 this is because talk of tradeoffs is unidirectional. Scholarly defenses of national security expertise will argue not that we must take care to preserve civil liberties, but "that the government must make tradeoffs, that policy should become less libertarian during emergencies, and that courts should stay out of the way." n3¶ **This question of tradeoffs cannot be approached without asking the question of *who* decides on the proper allocation of liberty and security**. n4 **Defenders of unbounded executive power argue that security relies on experts to whom citizens and courts alike must defer**. n5 Especially during emergencies, **executive officials are presumed to have superior information** [\*1513] about what is necessary to preserve security. n6 According to the deference thesis, to impose constitutional limits on executive discretion risks creating security harms rather than enhancing freedoms. Deference to experts means "that the executive branch, not Congress or the judicial branch, should make the tradeoff between security and liberty." n7 When citizens, scholars, or judges attempt to intervene in debates over the proper measure of security, defenders of unchecked executive power claim that "they are amateurs playing at security policy, and there is no reason to expect that courts can improve upon government's emergency policies in any systemic way." n8 On this view, citizens and courts lack sufficient specialized knowledge to make optimal decisions about security. According to Judge Richard Posner, critics of executive expertise risk erroneous tradeoffs, because "civil libertarians tend to exaggerate the costs . . . and to ignore or slight the benefits" of security policy. n9 To interpose legal principles protecting rights and liberties as barriers to security policy risks producing "tangible harms," n10 while adding nothing relevant to expert decision making.

**2NC**

***1ac ev agrees: an XO is behind the snafu in the first place***

Andru E. **Wall 11**

(Senior Associate with Alston & Bird LLP, former senior legal advisor for U.S. Special Operations Command Central; “Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities & Covert Action,” Harvard National Security Journal Vol. 3)

There is no rigid separation between Title 10 and Title 50. A more¶ accurate interpretation is simply that Title 10 clarifies roles and¶ responsibilities within DoD, while Title 50 clarifies roles and responsibilities¶ within the intelligence community; both titles explicitly recognize that the¶ Secretary of Defense has statutory roles and authorities under Title 10 and¶ under Title 50. ***Executive Order 12,333*** ***confirms this reading by directing***¶ ***the Secretary of Defense to collect intelligence for both his department and¶ the intelligence community writ large***. U.S. military doctrine further erodes¶ any attempted distinction between tactical, operational, and strategic¶ intelligence:¶ National assets such as intelligence and communications¶ satellites, previously considered principally in a strategic¶ context, are an important adjunct to tactical operations

Robert **Chesney 12**

(Charles I. Francis Professor in Law, University of Texas School of Law; “Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate,” JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY Vol. 5:539)

E***nhance Accountability within the Executive Branch***. The current legal¶ architecture requires presidential approval for “covert action” programs, but¶ the situation is complicated with respect to unacknowledged military¶ operations. An unacknowledged military operation must be authorized by¶ the President or at least the Secretary of Defense if it is collateral to an¶ anticipated overt military operation that is not yet imminent but for which¶ operational planning has been authorized – a sweeping set of circumstances.¶ But no such approval is required if the operation is collateral to ongoing¶ hostilities. This makes sense if the unacknowledged operation occurs in the¶ combat zone. If it occurs on the territory of another state outside the “hot”¶ battlefield, however, the risks are sufficient to warrant extension of the¶ requirement of presidential or at least secretarial authorization. Notably

***Making the military responsible solves – they cooperate with Congress and are transparent – all their 1AC ev is indicting the CIA***

**Zenko ’13**, Micah Zenko is the Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department's Office of Policy Planning. APRIL 16, 2013, Foreign Policy, Clip the Agency's Wings, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/16/clip_the_agencys_wings_cia_drones?page=full>, jj

Groups like Human Rights Watch and the Center for Civilians in Conflict also correctly warn that JSOC is itself a highly-secretive organization and that CIA and military teams operate jointly in pursuit of the same individual. For example, while a CIA drone killed Anwar al-Awlaki in September 2011, military aircraft stationed on nearby carriers would have been deployed if the agency drones failed. **It is unrealistic to fully disentangle the CIA and the Pentagon, as military operations routinely receive targeting information from elements within the Intelligence Community**. **The military,** however, **can be much more transparent than the CIA, if the president and secretary of defense make this a priority**. (Unfortunately, not one senator asked Hagel his opinion of drone strikes during his confirmation hearing.) **Military officers, even from the special operations community, are far more candid and honest about the benefits and limits of targeted killings than civilian intelligence officials**.¶ The **Obama** administration **has two central objectives for its promised targeted killings reforms: preventing constraints on its ability to conduct lethal operations, and setting precedents for the use of armed drones by other states**. **By law, institutional culture, and customary practice, drone strikes conducted by the CIA cannot reach even the minimum thresholds of transparency and accountability required to achieve either objective**. Thus, **if** President **Obama is serious about these reforms, he should implement the 9/11 Commission's unfulfilled recommendation and make the military responsible for America's drone campaigns.**

***Obama can do it***

**Stevenson, ’13** professor at Johns Hopkins’ Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (Charles A. Stevenson, 6 March 2013, “Stevenson: Overseeing the New Ways of War,” http://www.rollcall.com/news/stevenson\_overseeing\_the\_new\_ways\_of\_war-222773-1.html?)

***The case for a “Title 60” process for drone operations is even stronger if the administration adopts Mr. Brennan’s suggestion to move most CIA drone operations to Pentagon control***. Offensive cyber-operations would also be best handled under a similar legal process. CIA-run operations are already covered, but the Pentagon has created a new Cyber Command that could carry out large-scale cyber operations. And the administration has reportedly concluded that the President has broad power even to launch a pre-emptive cyber-strike to thwart an impending digital attack from abroad. If the circumstances are that dire, I suppose most Americans would support such an action. But **the way to limit abuses, and be sure that there is careful consideration beforehand and accountability afterward, is for the President himself to make the final decision and for a designated group in Congress to be notified as soon as possible.**

**XO – A2 Perm**

***It’s impossible and links to the net benefit because the aff restricts the president’s authority—***

***Obama would fight to retain authority, even if he supported the plan’s practice***

Gordon **Silverstein**, UC Berkeley Assistant Professor, December 200**9**, Bush, Cheney, and the Separation of Powers: A Lasting Legal Legacy?, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1161&context=schmooze\_papers

Less than six months into the new administration, many of Obama’s staunch supporters have been surprised—even appalled—that the new president not only had failed to fully repudiate many of the Bush-Cheney **legal** policies, but in some instances, actually seems to be embracing and extending those policy choices (Gerstein 2009; Goldsmith 2009a, 2009b; Greenwald 2009a, 2009b; Herbert 2009; Savage 2009a). In areas ranging from the assertion of the state secrets privilege in efforts to shut down lawsuits over warrantless wiretapping (Al-Haramain v. Obama; Jewel v. NSA) and extraordinary rendition (Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan) to those concerning lawsuits over detention and treatment at Guantánamo (Bostan v. Obama) and the reach of habeas corpus to Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan (Al Maqaleh v. Gates), as well as the continuing use of signing statements, the new Obama administration’s policies in a number of areas that were of intense interest during the campaign certainly do appear less dramatically different than one might have expected. Does this suggest that Obama actually will salvage and enhance the Bush-Cheney legal legacy? Early evidence suggests the answer is no. **There is a critical difference between policy and the legal foundation** on which that policy is constructed. The policies may be quite similar, at least in the first few months of the new administration, but the legal legacy will turn on the underlying legal arguments, the legal foundation on which these policies are built. Here we find a dramatic difference between Obama and Bush. Both are **clearly interested in maintaining strong executive power**, but whereas Bush built his claims on broad constitutional arguments, insisting that the executive could act largely unhampered by the other branches of government, the Obama administration has made clear that its claims to power are built on statutes passed by Congress, along with interpretations and applications of existing judicial doctrines. It may be the case, as one of the Bush administration’s leading Office of Legal Counsel attorneys argued, that far from reversing Bush-era policies, the new administration “has copied most of the Bush program, has expanded some of it, and has narrowed only a bit” (Goldsmith 2009a). But what is profoundly different are the constitutional and legal default foundations on which these policies, and the assertions of executive power to enforce them, are built. **Obama**, like virtually every chief executive in American History, **seems committed to building and holding executive power**. But unlike Bush, Obama is developing a far more traditional approach to this task, building his claims not on constitutional assertions of inherent power, but rather interpreting and applying existing statutes and judicial doctrines or, where needed, seeking fresh and expansive legislative support for his claims.

***Obama will backlash to assert executive war powers***

Ryan **Hendrickson**, Ph.D., Eastern Illinois University Professor, 20**10**, War Powers in the Obama Administration, http://thekeep.eiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=polisci\_fac

Although it is early in the Obama administration, these first military actions indicate that despite Obama’s and Biden’s records in the Senate of supporting meaningful congressional checks on the commander in chief, that old patterns are difficult to break; the commander in chief is leading, with limited engagement from Congress. Obama’s and Biden’s past actions in the Senate do not appear to be good indicators of their current practices in the White House. Their previous views on congressional war powers are not, at least from these first military decisions, the guiding constitutional principles that shape their relationship with the Congress. Much as for previous presidents, **assertiveness as commander in chief is an institutional pattern** in the conduct of the executive branch. Moreover, Congress generally continues to defer to the commander in chief, and partisan politics do not capture this element of executive legislative relations. In the era following the Second World War, **American presidents have increasingly asserted wide military powers**, as Congress has ceded much of its war powers authority to the president, which the American public seems to often accept and is evident again in the Obama presidency. These patterns comport with most literature on presidential war powers, and also indicate that similar to the Bush presidency, the centre of decisionmaking for American military policy is the White House and not the American Congress.

**2NC – Politics NB – Internal Checks**

***Congressional action causes fierce ideological debates that bog down the agenda --- internal checks avoid this***

**Metzger ’09**, Gillian E. Metzger, Professor of Law, Columbia Law School, October 7, 2009, Emory Law Journal, THE INTERDEPENDENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SEPARATION OF POWERS, <http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1061&context=columbia_pllt>, jj

A separate question to raise about internal separation of powers mechanisms concerns¶ their effectiveness, particularly as measures aimed at constraining executive branch¶ aggrandizement. Are they actually able to constrain excessive presidential assertions of authority¶ and other abuses? Or are they, in the end, little more than “parchment barriers” that are largely 61¶ ineffective or worse may obscure the extent of accumulated presidential power?¶ The case in favor of internal mechanisms is in part comparative. Real limitations exist on¶ the ability of traditional external constraints, specifically Congress and the courts, to check the¶ executive branch. **The fundamental impediments for Congress are internal ones, in particular its**¶ **need to proceed via the arduous process of bicameralism and presentment and the additional**¶ **obstacles created by congressional committees and rules**. **The ordinary burdens of the** 62¶ **legislative process are intensified in contexts involving efforts to check presidential authority**,¶ **given the frequent need to overcome a presidential veto**. Congress does wield important 63¶ investigatory and oversight powers, and has other tools that may give it leverage over the¶ president, such as control over spending or the ability to add contentious measures to must-pass¶ legislation. But **the political reality of party allegiance dominating over institutional interests**,¶ 64¶ **along with greater ideological cohesion in congressional parties, undermines these techniques** ¶ **and makes rigorous congressional constraints on presidential actions unlikely except in contexts**¶ **of divided government**. Moreover, even if Congress is willing to undertake oversight, its ability 65¶ to do so may be significantly hampered by executive branch non-cooperation or intransigence,¶ often in the form of assertions of executive privilege and failure to inform Congress of¶ contentious activities.66¶ Courts, in turn, face jurisdictional barriers that limit their ability to review executive¶ branch actions. Such barriers have recently surfaced in litigation challenging the government’s 67¶ expansion of domestic wiretapping without complying with FISA requirements, with the Sixth¶ Circuit holding that plaintiffs’ claims of injury from the program were too speculative to provide¶ a basis for standing to challenge the program. Even when actions are justiciable, the courts’ 68¶ effectiveness as a check can be significantly curtailed by their deference to reasonable executive¶ branch policy determinations, particularly in the area of national security. Courts are also reluctant to intervene to correct general failures in administration or prompt executive branch¶ action. An additional major impediment is delay; courts must wait for cases to come to them, 70¶ and challenges to presidential action or policy are likely to be appealed. This is not to say that 71¶ deference and inaction necessarily undermine judicial checks; the Supreme Court’s rejection of¶ the Bush Administration’s refusal to regulate greenhouse gases in Massachusetts v. EPA and 72¶ recent decisions rebuffing broad presidential assertions of power regarding the Guantanamo Bay¶ detainees are important testaments to the contrary. Yet even in these contexts the limits of 73¶ judicial constraints are evident. Although the EPA proposed regulating greenhouse gases under¶ the Clean Air Act in response to the decision in Massachusetts, the White House refused to act¶ on the proposal and no formal action towards regulating greenhouse gases had yet been taken¶ when President Obama assumed office over a year and a half later. The seven-year-and- 74¶ ongoing saga of habeas challenges involving the Guantanamo Bay detention center demonstrates¶ even more vividly that it can be years before judicial review forces a change in executive branch¶ behavior on the ground.75¶ **Several bases exist for thinking that internal separation of powers mechanisms may have**¶ **a comparative advantage**. **Internal mechanisms** operate ex ante, at the time when the executive¶ branch is formulating and implementing policy, rather than ex post; they are therefore able to **avoid the delay in application that can hamper** both judicial and **congressional oversight**.76¶ Internal mechanisms often operate continuously, rather than being limited to issues that generate¶ congressional attention or arise in the form of a justiciable challenge. Internal mechanisms 77¶ operate not just at the points at which policy proposals originate and are implemented but also at¶ higher managerial levels, and thus can address policy and administration in both a granular and a¶ systemic fashion. In addition, ***policy recommendations generated through internal checks may***¶ ***face less resistance than those offered externally***, because the latter frequently arise after¶ executive officials have already decided upon a policy course and are more likely to take an¶ adversarial form. **Internal mechanisms may also gain credibility with executive branch officials** 78¶ **to the extent they are perceived as contributing to more fully informed and expertise-based**¶ **decisionmaking.**79

***Obama spends PC to fight the plan’s implementation --- but he will support internal mechanisms***

**Metzger ’09**, Gillian E. Metzger, Professor of Law, Columbia Law School, October 7, 2009, Emory Law Journal, THE INTERDEPENDENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SEPARATION OF POWERS, <http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1061&context=columbia_pllt>, jj

It is also important not to lose sight of a centrally important fact: ***Presidents frequently***¶ ***support imposition of internal mechanisms that substantially constrain the executive branch***, **even**¶ **sometimes adopting such measures voluntarily on their own or at agency initiative**. Part of the 43¶ explanation for this is politics, but part is also that presidents are judged on their ability to govern¶ effectively. Terry Moe has argued that such presidential performance accountability leads to 44¶ core dynamics of executive branch centralization and politicization, as **a president wants “an**¶ **institutional system responsive to his needs as a political leader**. He values organizational¶ competence, to be sure, but what he seeks is “responsive competence,” not neutral¶ competence.” Yet **presidents’ political accountability may** also **lead them to support administrative structures that are more independen**t. As David Barron has recently noted,¶ sometimes “[a] system for making regulatory policy that is administrative in orientation may¶ itself serve a given President’s agenda,” a situation Barron contends existed under President¶ Franklin Roosevelt, who sought to “bulk[] up the regulatory state.” Presidents may also find 46¶ that responsiveness and competence conflict; in a recent study David Lewis concluded that¶ programs run by expert professional administrators perform better on the whole than those run by¶ political appointees. Presidents may well be willing to forego politicization or centralization at 47¶ times and opt for a form of administration they can less easily control, if they believe that doing¶ so will yield more effective performance. Finally, **presidents may also conclude that internal**¶ **constraints are in fact essential to ensure their ability to control administration, by providing a**¶ **mechanism that can limit on the ground discretion of agency officials**.48

**Adv 1**

**Ext – No Cyber Terror**

***They also don’t have the motivation***

**Knake ’10** (Robert K, international affairs fellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations studying cyber war, 2-16, CFR, “Cyberterrorism Hype v. Fact” <http://www.cfr.org/terrorism-and-technology/cyberterrorism-hype-v-fact/p21434>, jj)

Beyond the technical hurdles, **al-Qaeda's primary goal has always been to generate large numbers of casualties in addition to inflicting economic damage. But cyberattacks are largely weapons of mass disruption, not destruction**. **Causing a blackout or destroying airline reservations systems won't kill many people, if any at all. The worst-case scenario is that a cyberattack could override controls at a chemical or nuclear plant and cause a chemical release or nuclear meltdown. Such an incident could kill thousands if not millions. Thankfully, the control systems for plants that could cause that kind of harm are still "air gapped," disconnected from networks that connect to the Internet.** In attempting to attack the homeland, **the organization has relied on decidedly low-tech means. Of the twenty-two plots disrupted since 9/11, all involved the use of improvised explosives or small arms, and all were aimed at killing large numbers of people**. In its twenty-year existence, **al-Qaeda has never carried out a plot intended to do economic harm without also causing large numbers of casualties.**

**Ext – No China/Russia Cyber Attack**

***No motivation --- any attack would have knock on effects that would hurt Russia or China as well***

**Strand 12** (Paul Strand, CBN News Washington Sr. Correspondent, As senior correspondent in CBN's Washington, D.C., bureau, Paul Strand has covered a variety of political and social issues, with an emphasis on defense, justice, and Congress. CBN News, 10-3-12, America's Cyber Defenses: A Digital Pearl Harbor? <http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/us/2011/December/Americas-Cyber-Defenses-A-Digital-Pearl-Harbor-/>, jj)

**Carafano doubts a global power would be foolhardy enough to start up a cyber war**. **"For the Chinese or the Russians or someone to say, 'Well, let's take down the American Internet.' Okay fine, so then Walmart can't order any goods from China anymore**," he said. "**Well then, China, you're kind of out of business**. So **there is** this kind of ***m*utual *a*ssured *d*estruction there**." Also, **in this brave new cyber world, no one can be sure of nasty unintended consequences**. Stuxnet, the first cyber attack that did real damage in the real physical world, is one example.

***No inter-state cyber war---US has already established cyber deterrence***

**Barnett, June 20th, 2011** (Thomas P.M., chief analyst at Wikistrat and a contributing editor for Esquire magazine, His latest book is "Great Powers: America and the World After Bush", World Politics Review, “The New Rules: Don’t Fear U.S. Cyber Deterrence” <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/9217/the-new-rules-dont-fear-u-s-cyber-deterrence>, jj)

Putting aside the unrelenting expert hype concerning the "ease" of using the cyber domain to send America -- and America alone -- suddenly back to the 19th century, **the reality remains that the United States possesses the only military force in the world capable of projecting and sustaining power distant from its shores. Even after everybody has pulled their cyber triggers** and sent the world to some back-to-the-future debilitative state, **America will still have the conventional ability and the hardware, if it so chooses, to reverse through sheer force any significant advantage obtained by any recognized enemy during the network shutdown**. **Strategists can conjure any quick fait accompli they care to name, but if it's one that really matters to America, it can and will be reversed. The cyber realm does not alter that underlying correlation of forces; it merely confuses it in the minds of some.** But this is not new. We live in an age of magical thinking, where many imagine that the right attack, deftly delivered, will alter everything. In truth, such attacks, even the most fantastic ones, merely reveal rule-set gaps, or situations in which our political-military understanding hasn't kept pace with economic-network realities. So we backfill when required, and if we're smart enough, we backfill pre-emptively -- meaning, before we're subjected to a lesson likely to send us down some path of systemic overreaction, as Sept. 11 did. American strategists imagine our enemies using such lightning attacks to realign in one stroke the pieces on the global geopolitical chessboard, with the highest-profile scenario being China's fabled "assassin's mace" strategy of blinding U.S. military forces with a cyberattack, thereby allowing the People's Liberation Army to capture Taiwan in a heartbeat. But **the reality is that our real and potential nation-state enemies overwhelmingly view the cyber realm as a means of preventing the U.S. from doing the same to them**. After all, we remain the global system's most successful and vigorous revisionist power. Other regimes may speak boldly of toppling their enemies, but only America has an established track record of doing just that -- and on a regular basis. Nobody else even comes close. Take America's response to the system perturbation of Sept. 11: The U.S. set ought to recast a major chunk of the world in its image, just like it did after World War II with Western Europe and Japan. We can argue about the success of our latest system-shaping venture, as well as its cost. But only a fool would bet on the Middle East remaining unchanged. Indeed, all indications to date suggest a civilization hurtling toward a future far closer to our own blueprint than the 7th-century image of "paradise" peddled by al-Qaida. Contrast this to China's response to the system perturbation that is the Arab Spring, whose causality is far more easily traced to Western influences than Eastern ones: Instead of trying to influence events, China retracts out of fear, seeing in all those restive networks a harbinger of its doom as a single-party state. It happens to be an accurate reading of history, since China, compared to the United States and its impact on world history, remains small potatoes in the realm of revolutions. As a result, China and other rising powers [view the cyber realm as a great equalizer](http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/7274/chinas-faltering-cyber-security-efforts-offer-chance-for-engagement) against a revisionist superpower that continues to reformat the world in its image. So while we may seek what we consider to be fair restrictions in that cyber domain, our true competitors, before they accept such restrictions, will seek to reach a level of development at which all of our mutually shared vulnerabilities dramatically outweigh their perceived risk of suffering regime reformatting. As with all forms of arms control, the obvious agreements can be had today among likeminded polities -- North America, Europe, India, Brazil, Israel, South Africa, Turkey and Indonesia, among others. But countries like Russia, China and other single-party states continue to feel a natural reticence against any such understanding, reflected in their fierce firewalls and "national Internets." As such, **the cyber realm is slated for the same sort of blustery deterrence strategies that the world once collectively suffered early in the nuclear age, with America's assertion that it reserves the right to respond kinetically to a cyber attack one case in point**. **On the surface, that sounds like an entirely new realm of conflict, but it is nothing of the sort. It is simply America extending the same sort of deterrence logic regarding great-power war to the cyber realm: Logically, we assume that any enemy willing to launch a major cyber attack on America will be doing so as a precursor to something far worse, and so we reserve the right to go all the way in our response. Again, this approach is meant to be frightening -- as in, don't even think about going there. Since I, for one, don't think that China has the faintest intention of going there, I welcome the ambiguity that the strategy signals**. **Nobody dishes out payback like America does**, **and that attitude is fitting for the world's Leviathan, because system-level peace is what made our globalization experiment unfold at the fantastic pace it has these past six-plus decades. So there's no reason to fear America's decision to fold the cyber realm into this overall deterrence posture,** just as there is no reason to fear the continuing unwillingness of authoritarian regimes to submit to our desired rule-sets on this subject. **Time remains on America's side in all these structural evolutions, and globalization remains our winning hand.**

***No motivation for preemptive cyberwar***

**Matthews 3-16-11** (William, nextgov, “private sector not adequately defending U.S. cyberspace, security expert warns” <http://www.nextgov.com/nextgov/ng_20110316_8174.php?oref=topnews>, jj)

**The United States faces a number cyber risks. The most serious -- cyberwar -- seems unlikely**. **China and Russia** both could launch damaging cyberattacks, for which the United States is not prepared, Lewis said. But they **are unlikely to do so unless we were to get into a conventional war with them.**

**Ext #3 – No Transition Wars**

***Hegemony collapse doesn’t cause global wars --- their evidence is Cold War nostalgia***

**Buruma 12** Ian Buruma is a professor of democracy and human rights at Bard College, and most recently the author of “Taming the Gods: Religion and Democracy on Three Continents.” The Daily Star, 2-16-12, Military dominance is no longer adequate for U.S. interests <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/2012/Feb-16/163427-military-dominance-is-no-longer-adequate-for-us-interests.ashx#axzz1mXrvkaJI>, jj

**Less certain**, however, **is the premise that the world order would collapse without “American leadership**.” France’s King Louis XV allegedly declared on his deathbed: “Après moi, le déluge” (After me, the flood). **This is the conceit of all great powers**. Even as the British were dismantling their empire after World War II, the French and the Dutch still believed that parting with their Asian possessions would result in chaos. And it is still common to hear autocratic leaders who inherited parts of the Western empires claim that democracy is all well and good, but the people are not yet ready for it. **Those who monopolize power cannot imagine a world released from their grip as anything but a catastrophe**. In Europe after World War II, Pax Americana, guaranteed by U.S. military power, was designed “to keep the Russians out and Germany down.” In Asia, it was meant to contain communism, while allowing allies, from Japan to Indonesia, to build up economic strength. Spreading democracy was not the main concern; stopping communism – in Asia, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the Americas – was. In this respect, it succeeded, though at great human cost. But, now that the specter of global communist domination has joined other fears – real and imagined – in the dustbin of history, **it is surely time for countries to start handling their own affairs**. **Japan, in alliance with other Asian democracies, should be able to counterbalance China’s growing power**. Similarly, **Europeans are rich enough to manage their own security**. But neither Japan nor the EU seems ready to pull its own weight, owing in part to decades of dependency on security provided by the United States. As long as Uncle Sam continues to police the world, his children won’t grow up. In any case, as we have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, “savage wars of peace” are not always the most effective way of conducting foreign policy. **Old-fashioned military dominance is no longer adequate to promote American interests**. The Chinese are steadily gaining influence in Africa, not with bombers, but with money. Meanwhile, propping up secular dictators in the Middle East with Americans arms has helped to create Islamist extremism, which cannot be defeated by simply sending more drones. **The notion** promoted by Romney and his boosters **that only U.S. military power can preserve world order is deeply reactionary. It is a form of Cold War nostalgia** – a dream of returning to a time when much of the globe was recovering from a ruinous world war and living in fear of communism. **Obama’s recognition of America’s limitations is not a sign of cowardly pessimism, but of realistic wisdom**. His relative discretion in the Middle East has allowed people there to act for themselves. We do not yet know what the outcome there will be, but “the greatest country on earth” cannot impose a solution. Nor should it.

# 1NR

### 1NR Impact Overview

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#### Disad outweighs:

1. ***Magnitude and probability – Food shortages cause global nuclear war – most probable***

**Future Directions International ’12** (“International Conflict Triggers and Potential Conflict Points Resulting from Food and Water Insecurity Global Food and Water Crises Research Programme”, May 25, <http://www.futuredirections.org.au/files/Workshop_Report_-_Intl_Conflict_Triggers_-_May_25.pdf>)

There is a growing appreciation that the **conflicts in the next century will most likely be fought over a lack of resources**. Yet, in a sense, this is not new. **Researchers point to the French and Russian revolutions as conflicts induced by a lack of food.** More recently, **Germany’s World War Two efforts are said to have been inspired**, at least in part, **by its perceived need to gain access to more food**. Yet the general sense among those that attended FDI’s recent workshops, was that **the scale of the problem in the future could be significantly greater as a result of population pressures, changing weather, urbanisation, migration, loss of arable land and other farm inputs, and increased affluence in the developing world**. In his book, Small Farmers Secure Food, Lindsay Falvey, a participant in FDI’s March 2012 workshop on the issue of food and conflict, clearly expresses the problem and why countries across the globe are starting to take note. . He writes (p.36), “…**if people are hungry, especially in cities, the state is not stable – riots, violence, breakdown of law and order and migration result.” “Hunger feeds anarchy**.” This view is also shared by Julian Cribb, who in his book, The Coming Famine, writes that **if “large regions of the world run short of food, land or water in the decades that lie ahead, then wholesale, bloody wars are liable to follow**.” He continues: “***An increasingly credible scenario for World War 3 is not so much a confrontation of super powers and their allies, as a festering, self-perpetuating chain of resource conflicts.***” He also says: “**The wars of the 21st Century are less likely to be global conflicts with sharply defined sides and huge armies, than a scrappy mass of failed states, rebellions, civil strife, insurgencies, terrorism and genocides, sparked by bloody competition over dwindling resources**.” As another workshop participant put it, **people do not go to war to kill; they go to war over resources, either to protect or to gain the resources for themselves**. Another observed that hunger results in passivity not conflict. Conflict is over resources, not because people are going hungry. A study by the International Peace Research Institute indicates that **where food security is an issue, it is more likely to result in some form of conflict. Darfur, Rwanda, Eritrea and the Balkans experienced such wars.** Governments, especially in developed countries, are increasingly aware of this phenomenon. **The UK Ministry of Defence, the CIA, the US Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Oslo Peace Research Institute, all identify famine as a potential trigger for conflicts and possibly even *nuclear war.***

#### Timeframe—Farm bill is up for a vote before Thanksgiving—aff solvency takes years

#### Threshold for our impact is low—blips kill billions

Tampa Tribune in’ 96

(“Grain Shortage Growing Problem”, January 20, L/N)

"Even if they are merely blips, higher international prices can hurt poor countries that import a significant portion of their food," he said. "Rising prices can also quickly put food out of reach of the 1.1 billion people in the developing world who live on a dollar a day or less."

“he” is Per Pinstrup-Andersen, director of the International Food Policy Research Institute.

**Turns Econ**

***The farm bill is key to economic growth and competitiveness***

**The Hill ’12** (John Hoeven, Republican Senator from North Dakota, A cost-effective Farm Bill with a strong, market-based safety net, The Hill, June 13, 2012, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-a-budget/232627-a-cost-effective-farm-bill-with-a-strong-market-based-safety-net)

America’s security and prosperity depend on the productivity of American farmers and ranchers, which is why I am urging strong support for the bipartisan, cost-effective farm bill that we have developed in the U.S. Senate Agriculture Committee. The Agriculture Reform, Food and Jobs Act now making its way through Congress is aptly named, because it is about food, fiber and fuel, but it is also about jobs, the health of our economy and the security of our nation.¶ First of all, farmers and ranchers throughout our country provide the highest quality, lowest-cost food supply, not only in the world, but in the entire history of the world. That makes the health of America’s farm economy vitally important to every single American anywhere in our country. Our bill will enable producers to continue that remarkable record by making sure they have an enhanced, market-based crop insurance program.¶ The Farm Bill is cost-effective and saves money¶ At the same time, however, our legislation will streamline farm programs to make them more cost-effective and efficient, and provide more than $23 billion in deficit reduction. It’s not only cost-effective, but provides real savings to help reduce the deficit and debt. Of the $23 billion it saves, $15 billion comes from farm programs and $6 billion from conservation programs. That represents a ten percent reduction in the ag budget. Producers have recognized the need for fiscal responsibility and worked with us throughout the process to put together good, strong farm legislation that spends fewer dollars.¶ The Farm Bill is about jobs, economic growth and national security¶ America’s farm economy is also an economic engine, supporting millions of jobs and generating billions of dollars in income. U.S. farmers and ranchers employ more than 16 million Americans, either directly or indirectly, in producing and processing food, fiber or fuel for our nation. Total cash receipts for producers in 2011 are expected to be a record $341 billion. In my home state of North Dakota, agricultural activities account for a quarter of the state’s economy and nearly 25 percent of all jobs.¶ Agriculture, moreover, has a positive balance of trade. Last year, the U.S. hit an all-time ag-export record of more than $137 billion, besting the previous record in 2008 by $22 billion. That generated a record trade surplus in agriculture of nearly $43 billion.¶ Finally, and perhaps most important of all, good farm policy is vital from a national security perspective. Think about the implications if we had to depend on other countries for food, as we do for oil – countries that don’t share our vital interests or values. Instead, with good farm policy, we know we can continue to rely on our hard-working farmers and ranchers right here at home.¶ The Farm Bill includes a strong market-based safety net for producers¶ To ensure the reliability of America’s farm sector, our farm bill includes the kind of market-based risk-management tools that producers need. One of the key things we tried to do is figure out how we could help farmers and ranchers insure their crops affordably at higher levels. We did that by enhancing crop insurance with the inclusion of a Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO). The SCO enables producers to purchase a supplemental policy beyond their individual farm-based policy.¶ In addition, the bill features a new Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) program that addresses multiple-year losses. The program works with crop insurance by covering between 11 and 21 percent of a producer’s historic five-year average revenues based on price and yield.¶ The new farm bill enables producers to continue to produce high-quality, low-cost agricultural products for America – and at the same time, produce jobs, economic growth and security for our nation. We worked together in a bipartisan way in committee to draft and approve good farm legislation, and now I encourage my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to pass the bill on the Senate floor. Every American depends on it, now and into the future.

### 2NC Will Pass

#### Will pass---compromise happens now

Aaron Martin, Anchor, Reporter, 11/15, 2013, WLSL, Morgan Griffith believes farm bill will pass, <http://www.wsls.com/story/23976991/morgan-griffith-believes-farm-bill-will-pass>, jj

SALEM - Despite the long battle over the Farm Bill, one local congressman is confident about its future. Republican Representative Morgan Griffith believes some form of the bill will be passed before the end of the year. It's an optimistic view on a bill that's been a political lightning rod. For the more than a year Congress has argued over what to include, specifically whether food stamps should be passed separately. "I do think some form of the farm bill will be passed," Griffith said. "Our farmers need that bill to pass and of course we need to make sure we take care of those people that truly need help." Griffith believes there is room for both sides to compromise.

#### Progress on farm bill now—it’s the Core focus until Thanksgiving—the next two weeks are key to prevent food price spikes

West Central Tribune 11/11, Farm Bill negotiations continue, <http://www.wctrib.com/content/farm-bill-negotiations-continue>, jj

WASHINGTON — The four principal negotiators on the farm bill appear to have made some progress at one meeting last week and seem likely to be engaged in intensive negotiations during the two weeks before Congress is scheduled to break for Thanksgiving. A new farm bill has passed the House and the Senate in different forms, and a conference committee headed by the Democratic and Republican leaders of the Agriculture committees are working to reconcile the differences so that a conference report can be presented to both houses before the end of the year and sent to President Obama for his signature. The four principals — House Agriculture Committee Chairman Frank Lucas, R-Okla., House Agriculture ranking member Collin Peterson, D-Minn., Senate Agriculture Committee Chairwoman Debbie Stabenow, D-Mich., and Senate Agriculture ranking member Thad Cochran, R-Miss., met Wednesday for at least two hours and made enough progress that Stabenow said Thursday that they needed to get cost scores on the new proposals from the Congressional Budget Office in order to proceed. In a brief interview off the Senate floor, Stabenow said her meeting Thursday with the other three principal farm bill negotiators — Cochran, Lucas and Peterson — had been a “really good discussion” about “a broad framework,” but she added, “We’ve got to get scores.” Asked whether the four principals would meet as soon as the House and Senate return after Veterans Day, Stabenow said that the four are in constant communication. During the vote on the Employment Non-discrimination Act, which would ban workplace discrimination against gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender employees, Stabenow was in discussion on the Senate floor with Sen. John Hoeven, R-N.D., for at least 15 minutes. Stabenow would not say whether they were talking about the farm bill in that discussion, but she said that she and Hoeven “talk all the time about the farm bill” and that those discussions are “very positive.” The two weeks beginning today are likely to determine whether Congress will finish the farm bill this year. Both the House and the Senate will be in session during that time. But both chambers are scheduled to leave Nov. 22 for a Thanksgiving break, and congressional aides have said they are likely to be out of session for two weeks. That schedule would mean that members would return Dec. 9 for another two-week session before they are expected to depart Dec. 20 for the Christmas and New Year’s holidays. Although the House- and Senate-passed farm bills do not expire at the end of December because the congressional session will continue for another year, Congress is under pressure to finish the farm bill by then, in part to avoid another round of headlines about milk prices skyrocketing if permanent farm laws from 1938 and 1949 go into effect.

#### GOP is on board now—problems will be overcome before 2014

David Rogers 11/14 has covered Congress for better than 30 years and was an early addition to POLITICO in January 2008. 11/14/13, Politico, Republicans more optimistic on farm bill, <http://www.politico.com/story/2013/11/republicans-farm-bill-99889.html>, jj

House Republicans were more upbeat Thursday on getting a farm bill done this year, with Speaker John Boehner raising the subject and Agriculture Committee Chairman Frank Lucas saying he and his Senate counterparts are “getting to a common point on the commodity title.” “I can say that all the face-to-face meetings that have gone on with the principals — in the last couple of weeks — have made progress,” Lucas told POLITICO. “We are getting to a common point on the commodity title.” “There are still some big principles: choice vs. all inclusive, how you calculate the acres. But we are moving and staff on a variety of fronts are ironing out the differences.” Talks between the Oklahoma Republicans and Senate Agriculture Committee Chairwoman Debbie Stabenow (D-Mich.) are expected to continue late Thursday. And at his weekly news conference Thursday morning, Boehner included the farm bill as part of his year-end agenda. “There are issues that can be resolved before the end of the year, including reforms to our farm programs, a bill to reauthorize important water projects around the country and hopefully a budget agreement so that we can stop lurching from one crisis to another,” the speaker told reporters. “We have got a chance to find common ground, and I am hopeful that we can make progress on all of these issues.”

#### Agreement before December 15th, but it’s a fight

Jennifer Loesch, 11/8 Night Cops / General Assignment Reporter, News, Lubbock Avalanche Journal, Conaway says farm bill almost done, <http://lubbockonline.com/local-news/2013-11-08/conaway-says-farm-bill-almost-done#.UoUsENKsim4>, jj

U.S. Rep. Mike Conaway, R-Texas, paid a visit to the Texas Tech campus and stopped by the Experimental Sciences building for a tour Friday, Nov. 8. The chairman of the subcommittee on general farm commodities and risk management said he was confident the House and the Senate could reach an agreement on § Marked 19:36 § the heavily-debated farm bill by Dec. 15. “The non-nutrition pieces are coming together pretty quickly. It’s the nutrition piece that’s going to be the toughest for everyone to get their arms around and come to an agreement,” Conaway said. The House wants to cut $40 billion from the government’s nutrition program, and the Senate only wants to cut $4 billion from the program. Conaway called it a difference in policy. He discussed some of the sticking points between the House and Senate.

#### Obama’s PC behind the scenes is key to an agreement --- this ev is specific to SNAP

Bruce Knight, Agri-Pulse, 10/28, Farm Bill 2013: Inside the conference, <http://www.agri-pulse.com/Opinion-Farm-Bill-2013-Inside-the-conference.asp>, jj

Good news-the farm bill is moving once again. We have conferees named, and this week they will meet to begin reconciling the House and Senate versions of the legislation. I'd like to guide you behind the scenes and give you my take on what's likely to happen and how to view what you hear reported in the media as the conferees gather and start this process. First, we all know that it's taken us a long time to get to this point, but I'm optimistic that we can have a farm bill completed by the end of this year. I see four major differences between the bills that conferees will need to address. These include farm income support, dairy policy, whether to re-link conservation compliance to crop insurance and funding levels for SNAP (food stamps). In recent days we've seen staffs from the House and Senate Ag Committees meeting with each other as well as an upswing in visits of interest group members with legislators named to the conference committee. On the one hand, it's unfortunate that the farm bill process has taken so long, since the delays have resulted in increasing polarization and solidifying of positions. On the other hand, this is the first farm bill for a number of members and their staffs, so the lengthy process has enabled them to get up to speed on the issues. As representatives and senators work together, I hope and pray that conferees will step away from any sense that either the House or the Senate is the “winner” on particular issues. Rather, I hope they will work collaboratively to produce a farm bill that's best for farmers, taxpayers and other constituencies. Despite variances in terminology and somewhat different approaches on major issues, I don't think the differences between the bills are nearly as significant as some of the rhetoric would suggest. Of course, as readers of this blog know, I believe strongly that re-linking conservation compliance and crop insurance is in the best interests of those involved in production agriculture, those committed to conservation and environmental objectives and those who are concerned about a strong and vibrant crop insurance program. Now that crop insurance has become an essential management tool for most farmers, the program is also attracting critics. It's particularly important that the conservation community step forward to embrace the role of friends and advocates for crop insurance-and linking insurance subsidies to maintaining minimal conservation measures. It's also important to link farm program assistance to base or historical plantings rather than actual planted acres. To do anything else runs the risk of distorting planting decisions and risking trade disputes and environmental consequences. The past six farm bills have systematically delinked farm supports and planting distortions caused by farm programs. In the rush to end direct payments, we shouldn't inadvertently undo this fundamental principle of separating support from planting decisions. As the conferees begin their deliberations, don't be too swayed by media reports as this person or that makes an opening statement. The real work is going on behind the scenes. And here's the bottom line: what really matters is what happens beyond the purview of the conference committee. What is critical for us to get a farm bill this year is for the Administration, the House leadership and the Senate leadership to come to terms on a dollar amount for nutrition programs. Barring agreement on that number, there will be no farm bill this year. Once there's a dollar figure, which includes a reduction in costs for SNAP, getting other differences in the farm bill will be a snap!

### A2: Winners Win---Top Level

#### The plan isn’t a win---our links prove it has no supporters.

***( ) Link outweighs “winners win” on timeframe***

**Silber ‘7**

(PhD Political Science & Communication – focus on the Rhetoric of Presidential Policy-Making – Prof of Poli Sci – Samford, [Marissa, WHAT MAKES A PRESIDENT QUACK?, Prepared for delivery at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30th-September 2nd, 2007, UNDERSTANDING LAME DUCK STATUS THROUGH THE EYES OF THE MEDIA AND POLITICIANS]

Important to the discussion of political capital is whether or not it can be replenished over a term. If a President expends ***p***olitical ***c***apital on his agenda, can it be replaced? Light suggests that “capital declines over time – public approval consistently falls: midterm losses occur” (31). Capital can be rebuilt, but ***only to a limited extent***. The decline of capital makes it difficult to access information, recruit more expertise and maintain energy. If a lame duck President can be defined by a loss of political capital, this paper helps determine if such capital can be replenished or if a lame duck can accomplish little. Before determining this, a definition of a lame duck President must be developed.

#### Wins don’t spillover---capital is finite---prioritizing issues is key

Schultz 13 David Schultz is a professor at Hamline University School of Business, where he teaches classes on privatization and public, private and nonprofit partnerships. He is the editor of the Journal of Public Affairs Education (JPAE). “Obama's dwindling prospects in a second term,” MinnPost, 1/22, http://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2013/01/obamas-dwindling-prospects-second-term

Four more years for Obama. Now what? What does Barack Obama do in his second term and what can he accomplish? Simply put, his options are limited and the prospects for major success quite limited. Presidential power is the power to persuade, as Richard Neustadt famously stated. Many factors determine presidential power and the ability to influence including personality (as James David Barber argued), attitude toward power, margin of victory, public support, support in Congress, and one’s sense of narrative or purpose. Additionally, presidential power is temporal, often greatest when one is first elected, and it is contextual, affected by competing items on an agenda. All of these factors affect the political power or capital of a president. Presidential power also is a finite and generally decreasing product. The first hundred days in office – so marked forever by FDR’s first 100 in 1933 – are usually a honeymoon period, during which presidents often get what they want. FDR gets the first New Deal, Ronald Reagan gets Kemp-Roth, George Bush in 2001 gets his tax cuts. Presidents lose political capital, support But, over time, presidents lose political capital. Presidents get distracted by world and domestic events, they lose support in Congress or among the American public, or they turn into lame ducks. This is the problem Obama now faces. Obama had a lot of political capital when sworn in as president in 2009. He won a decisive victory for change with strong approval ratings and had majorities in Congress — with eventually a filibuster margin in the Senate, when Al Franken finally took office in July. Obama used his political capital to secure a stimulus bill and then pass the Affordable Care Act. He eventually got rid of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell and secured many other victories. But Obama was a lousy salesman, and he lost what little control of Congress that he had in the 2010 elections.

#### Best political science proves

Jackie Calmes, NYTimes, 11/12/12, In Debt Talks, Obama Is Ready to Go Beyond Beltway, mobile.nytimes.com/2012/11/12/us/politics/legacy-at-stake-obama-plans-broader-push-for-budget-deal.xml

That story line, stoked by Republicans but shared by some Democrats, holds that Mr. Obama is too passive and deferential to Congress, a legislative naïf who does little to nurture personal relationships with potential allies in short, not a particularly strong leader. Even as voters re-elected Mr. Obama, those who said in surveys afterward that strong leadership was the most important quality for a president overwhelmingly chose Mr. Romney.¶ George C. Edwards III, a leading scholar of the presidency at Texas A & M University who is currently teaching at Oxford University, dismissed such criticisms as shallow and generally wrong. Yet Mr. Edwards, whose book on Mr. Obama's presidency is titled "Overreach," said, "He didn't understand the limits of what he could do."¶ "They thought they could continuously create opportunities and they would succeed, and then there would be more success and more success, and we'd build this advancing-tide theory of legislation," Mr. Edwards said. "And that was very naïve, very silly. Well, they've learned a lot, I think."¶ "Effective leaders," he added, "exploit opportunities rather than create them."¶ The budget showdown is an opportunity. But like many, it holds risks as well as potential rewards.¶ "This election is the second chance to be what he promised in 2008, and that is to break the gridlock in Washington," said Kenneth M. Duberstein, a Reagan White House chief of staff, who voted for Mr. Obama in 2008 and later expressed disappointment. "But it seems like this is a replay of 2009 and 2010, when he had huge majorities in the House and Senate, rather than recognizing that 'we've got to figure out ways to work together and it's not just what I want.' "¶ For now, at least, Republican lawmakers say they may be open to raising the tax bill for some earners. "We can increase revenue without increasing the tax rates on anybody in this country," said Representative Tom Price, Republican of Georgia and a leader of House conservatives, on "Fox News Sunday." "We can lower the rates, broaden the base, close the loopholes."¶ The challenge for Mr. Obama is to use his postelection leverage to persuade Republicans or to help Speaker John A. Boehner persuade Republicans that a tax compromise is in their party's political interest since most Americans favor compromise and higher taxes on the wealthy to reduce annual deficits.¶ Some of the business leaders the president will meet with on Wednesday are members of the new Fix the Debt coalition, which has raised about $40 million to urge lawmakers and their constituents to support a plan that combines spending cuts with new revenue. That session will follow Mr. Obama's meeting with labor leaders on Tuesday.¶ His first trip outside Washington to engage the public will come after Thanksgiving, since Mr. Obama is scheduled to leave next weekend on a diplomatic trip to Asia. Travel plans are still sketchy, partly because his December calendar is full of the traditional holiday parties.¶ Democrats said the White House's strategy of focusing both inside and outside of Washington was smart. "You want to avoid getting sucked into the Beltway inside-baseball games," said Joel Johnson, a former adviser in the Clinton White House and the Senate. "You can still work toward solutions, but make sure you get out of Washington while you are doing that."¶ The president must use his leverage soon, some Democrats added, because it could quickly wane as Republicans look to the 2014 midterm elections, when the opposition typically takes seats from the president's party in Congress.

### A2: PC Not Real/Hirsh

#### Reject Hirsh---he’s a staff writer with no qualifications---hasn’t conducted any studies

#### PC’s real, observable, and quantifiable---scholarly work proves---and you should reject quibbles like Hirsh

Kimberly L. Casey 8, Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science at William Jewel College, 2008, “Defining Political Capital: A Reconsideration of Bourdieu’s Interconvertibility Theory,” http://lilt.ilstu.edu/critique/spring%202008/casey.pdf

Abstract: This article examines the concept “political capital” (PC) and its context in American politics. Political capital is ill-defined, little understood, yet an important concept for understanding political exchange and relationships in the political arena. I establish a definition based upon Pierre Bourdieu’s interconvertibility theory, which indicates that capital types, such as economic, social, and symbolic forms, interact and can be exchanged for one another. Since the material and non-material components of capital variations are transposable, it can be argued that no capital form is essentially “pure”—every type of capital contains elements of other varieties. Political capital, therefore, is an amalgamation of capital types combined in various ways for specific political markets. It is market demand that shapes capital formation. Capital elements from other capital types inherent in the candidacy market are identified as an example. An index for measuring this variant of political capital is created, demonstrating its conceptual viability. ¶ Introduction: After the 2004 U.S. presidential election, George W. Bush publicized his intent to utilize “political capital” for future projects garnered as a result of his victory. But what exactly is political capital? However much the term is bandied about by politicians or the press, political capital has no established definition in political science literature. Although it remains ill-defined and unmeasured, it is an important concept for understanding political exchange and relationships in the political arena despite the reservations some political scientists have expressed about its applicability because of its complex material and nonmaterial associations. An analysis of sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s interconvertibility theory allows for conceptualization of material and non-material of interactions among capital forms making it possible to define political capital and design an index to measure it based upon previous capital literature.¶ To develop an empirical basis for political capital, this article first examines the associations it connotes in the popular press today. In contrast, a definition of political capital based upon capitalization literature and Bourdieu’s interconvertibility theory is presented. Then, a theory of political capital functions and markets are suggested. Theorizing leads to proposals for objective means of identification and measurement. To illustrate the market association between capital and politics, an index associated with the resources associated with the candidacy market is offered. The paper concludes with directions that studying the concept of political capital may take towards theory-building and framework creation.¶ Defining Political Capital ¶ It is erroneous to refer a “body” of PC literature when seeking a definition. Most writers and concerned actors who invoke the term political capital assume that its meaning is understood. It is inferred to be an entity which political actors possess, build up and spend. 1 However, a definition of “political capital” is typically never stated—the reader or observer is left to determine their own definition based upon the politician’s or journalist’s usage of the term (Suellentrop 2004; Kennicott 2004; “A Year of Setbacks” 2005; and Froomkin 2004). The subjectivity is not reflective of what political capital conceptually means in and to the political arena. Without a sound definition that accurately portrays the elements of political capital as it works within a political marketplaces, such as the electoral arena, and among office holders (executive, legislative, and judicial), bureaucracy, and in society in general, the concept is meaningless. ¶ Defining and utilizing PC as a viable political variable can evolve from the proliferation of capital theories in various fields of study. Political capital can and should be associated with a wide variety of previous “capital” interpretations. The key to explicating political capital is within capital literatures and how they address materialism, non-materialism, and combining the two elements.2¶ The theory of capital is traditionally associated with economics. There is no clear consensus in defining capital as an ideological function applicable beyond material exchange as expounded in economic capital theory, however. Yet nonmaterial forms of capital are well established in scholarly literature. Most of the “capital type” definitions hover around the meaning and terminology of economic capital. Certain theorists believe that all capital forms, regardless of their composition or purpose, connect in some way with economic capital. 3 Pierre Bourdieu’s work is invaluable in understanding capital as conceptually distinguishable from its individual aberrations as a material phenomenon. Bourdieu extends the ideas and metaphor of economic interest (material or physical pursuits) to include non-economic goods and services (symbolic or nonmaterial pursuits). Within this conceptualization, Bourdieu constructs a science of practices that “analyzed all human functions as ‘oriented towards the maximization of material or symbolic profit.’” 4 His theory of capital has limitations, however. He relies on ideal types and lacks the empirical research needed to support much theory. It is impossible to refer to capital-types and not acknowledge Bourdieu’s contributions to multiple capital species (Bourdieu1986; Kane 2001; Putnam 2001; Becker 1993); Fitz-Enz 2000; Davenport 1999; Marr 2005).

#### Hirsh agrees with the thesis of the politics DA even if he disagrees with the term “political capital”

Michael Hirsh, National Journal, 2/7/13, There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital, www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207

Presidents are limited in what they can do by time and attention span, of course, just as much as they are by electoral balances in the House and Senate. But this, too, has nothing to do with political capital. Another well-worn meme of recent years was that Obama used up too much political capital passing the health care law in his first term. But the real problem was that the plan was unpopular, the economy was bad, and the president didn’t realize that the national mood (yes, again, the national mood) was at a tipping point against big-government intervention, with the tea-party revolt about to burst on the scene. For Americans in 2009 and 2010—haunted by too many rounds of layoffs, appalled by the Wall Street bailout, aghast at the amount of federal spending that never seemed to find its way into their pockets—government-imposed health care coverage was simply an intervention too far. So was the idea of another economic stimulus. Cue the tea party and what ensued: two titanic fights over the debt ceiling. Obama, like Bush, had settled on pushing an issue that was out of sync with the country’s mood.¶ Unlike Bush, Obama did ultimately get his idea passed. But the bigger political problem with health care reform was that it distracted the government’s attention from other issues that people cared about more urgently, such as the need to jump-start the economy and financial reform. Various congressional staffers told me at the time that their bosses didn’t really have the time to understand how the Wall Street lobby was riddling the Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation with loopholes. Health care was sucking all the oxygen out of the room, the aides said.

#### GO BACK TO FLOW!!!!!

**2NC – Fight to Defend**

#### War powers fights kill Obama’s capital – extend Kriner – the plan puts Obama on the defensive – Congress will jump at the opportunity to criticize him – imperils the whole agenda

***Plan drains capital – Obama use all his capital to resist the plan’s restriction on his authority***

**George ’10**, Daniel George, J.D., 2010, The George Washington University Law School, June, 2010¶ The George Washington Law Review¶ 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 942, Note: That Is What We Said, but This Is What We Meant: Putting the Meaning Back into Use-of-Force Legislation, Lexis, jj

**There is a fundamental flaw**, however, **in assuming that Congress can manifest its will by enacting a *statute limiting the authority* of the President to act**. Enacting a statute requires either presidential approval [\*944] or a supermajority of Congress willing to override a presidential veto. n6 **A rational President would not sign such limiting legislation, and rarely does Congress have a supermajority to overcome such a veto**. n7 Likewise, a rational Congress would probably not waste time drafting and debating a bill guaranteed to face a veto, which again highlights the issue that Congress faces in deciding whether to continue the public debate, though meaningless, or move on to other matters.

***OCO restrictions are contentious in Congress – they stall the agenda***

Aaron **Brecher**, 20**12**, “Cyberattacks and the Covert Action Statute: Toward a Domestic Legal Framework for Offensive Cyberoperations,” Michigan LR, December, pp. LN, KEL

Finally, **while urging Congress to clarify the law governing cyberattacks may be advisable, one should consider the reality that such legislation is very difficult to pass**. Congress is notoriously slow to act and **legislation is difficult to push through the arduous process to enactment**. **There are numerous stages** in the process **at which a bill**, even on an issue of significant importance, **can be** stalled or killed**.** n170 For example, a bill may not be considered by its corresponding committee in either House, may be bogged down with amendments that cause it to lose support, or be subject to the Senate filibuster, among other "vetogates." n171 **In the case of clarifying the appropriate procedures for conducting a cyberattack, there may be concern that such legislation, either by imposing substantive constraints or reporting requirements, will improperly burden the president on a national security issue of increasing importance.** Congress as an institution tends to acquiesce to presidential prerogative in national security matters. n172 Further, given that Congress has recently addressed cyberattacks in legislation, albeit in an unhelpfully vague provision, n173 the possibility of expansive legislative clarification in the near future seems even more remote.

***Cyber Offensive Operations authority is contentious in Congress***

Tim **Starks**, CQ Staff, June 16, 20**12**, “Sorting Out Rules of Cyberwar,” Congressional Quarterly, <http://public.cq.com/docs/weeklyreport/weeklyreport-000004107497.html>, KEL

**Congress has made lots of noise over the past two weeks about leaks that reveal the United States’ role in creating Stuxnet**, the sophisticated computer worm that infected Iranian nuclear facilities in 2010. Some Republicans angrily allege that the leaks were brazen politicking by the Obama administration to buttress its national security credentials in an election year. Others call for an investigation by an independent counsel. And both Democrats and Republicans openly worry that the public acknowledgement of a U.S. role in unleashing an offensive cyber weapon opens the way for other nations to retaliate. **Masked by all the outrage**, though, **are substantial questions about Congress’ role in the new era of warfare and espionage. The debate over how best to defend U.S. computer networks has gone on in Congress for three years and still hasn’t been resolved**. **The debate over offensive actions** against the networks of others has been a quieter one, and **has only just begun**. “**It’s a huge problem, and we haven’t sorted out the authorities, nor has the military, and they acknowledge it,**” says Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin, a Michigan Democrat. “**There is a lot going on, not just in terms of legislation but inside the administration. There is a huge amount of energy that is being expended**, not just in figuring out how to get a better, more effective defense, but also what authorities exist for offense.” C**ongress has barely scratched the surface of such issues as the statutory definition of “cyberwar,” and when or how lawmakers should be briefed on military cyber operations** — two related topics, since most legal and cyber experts agree that programs such as Stuxnet straddle the line between espionage and attack. That line determines who in Congress is informed about what. The fiscal 2012 defense authorization law made an opening attempt at addressing those questions, and the fiscal 2013 version might make another.

***OCO authority is contentious in Congress***

Charles A. **Stevenson**, teaches at Johns Hopkins’ Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, “Stevenson: Overseeing the New Ways of War,” Roll Call, March 6, 20**13**, <http://www.rollcall.com/news/stevenson_overseeing_the_new_ways_of_war-222773-1.html>, KEL

**There’s a lot of** confusion and **disagreement over how the government should manage two increasingly important techniques of waging war: drones and cyber-activities**. President Barack Obama’s current counter-terrorism adviser and nominee to head the CIA, John Brennan, says the drone operations should be largely shifted from the CIA to the Pentagon. Some lawmakers want to create a special new court to review targeted killing operations. Meanwhile, **Congress has repeatedly failed to agree on how to build cybersecurity domestically, and there is no consensus on what laws should control offensive cyber-operations**.

**1NR: A2: Food Impact Defense**

***Riots will escalate ---- spills over to collapse international stability***

**Sinjela in ‘8**

(Encyla, States News Service, “HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL CALLS FOR ALL STAKEHOLDERS TO TAKE ACTION TO ENSURE RIGHT TO FOOD IN FACE OF GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS”, 5-22, L/N)

ENCYLA M. SINJELA (Zambia) said that Zambia had co-sponsored the convening of this Special Session because it believed that it was timely. That was evident from the food-related riots that had taken place in more than 20 countries in different parts of the world as a result of the food crisis caused by high food prices. Zambia also believed that this session would provoke some thoughts for the High-Level Conference on World Food Security and the Challenges of Climate Change and Bionergy scheduled to take place from 3 to 5 June 2008 in Rome. If rising prices of food were not controlled, the riots they had witnessed over the past few months were bound to spread to other parts of the world, thus threatening international peace and security. The international community therefore had to make concerted and coordinated efforts to ensure that the situation was contained and that the causes of high food prices and their consequences were adequately addressed.

***Even absent a sufficient causal relationship food scarcity is a key trigger factor for escalating pre-existing conflicts***

**Messer et al in ‘1**

(Ellen, Visiting Associate Prof. Nutrition Science and Policy @ Tufts, Marc Cohen, Special Assistant to the Director General @ International Food Policy Research Institute, and Thomas Marchione, Nutrition advisor at the Bureau for Humanitarian Response @ USAID, “Conflict: A Cause and Effect of Hunger”, <http://wwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/ECSP7-featurearticles-1.pdf>)

There is a high correlation between a country's involvement in conflict and its classification by FAO as a “low-income food deficit” country. Such countries have high proportions of food-insecure households. And, as already noted, conflict is also highly correlated with high rates of child mortality (see Figure 2), which is a common index for food insecurity. Nevertheless, a number of analysts have challenged the notion that food insecurity is a causal factor in conflict. Paarlberg, for instance, argues that environmental scarcities such as land shortage, land degradation, and rapid population growth—what he refers to as “eco-Malthusian emiseration”—are not generally a factor in African conflicts. Rather, Paarlberg notes, the level of conflict in Africa has been relatively stable since the end of the colonial era. In his view, “[a] far more convincing explanation for violent conflict in sub-Saharan Africa starts with the serious geographical mismatch, long noticed on the continent, between post-colonial national boundaries and ethnic boundaries.” (Paarlberg, 1999, page 1). More generally, Gleditsch (1998) has pointed out that most conflicts can be sufficiently explained as a result of political, economic, and cultural factors, without reference to environmental scarcities. In fact, neither viewpoint precludes a food-security connection. Even Homer-Dixon (1999), a leading figure in the environmental security field, concedes that environmental scarcity alone does not inevitably result in conflict. Instead, he stresses that resource constraints can have a profound influence on the social factors that eventually lead to conflict—as when elites monopolize control over scarce resources (such as water, cropland, or forests) and non-elites perceive themselves as unfairly deprived. As an example of how this works in practice, Uvin (1996b) argues persuasively that environmental factors in general—and food insecurity in particular—critically contributed to triggering the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Per capita food production and availability had declined dramatically in Rwanda over the preceding decade. The collapse of the world price of coffee in 1985 greatly reduced local and national government revenues and sapped rural households' purchasing power, even as urban job opportunities grew scarce and food prices rose. Deteriorating living conditions made many Rwandans into a ready audience for government appeals to ethnic hatred.

***Food shortages risk global nuclear war***

**Wenyu et al in ‘6**

(Xie, Prof. Phil. @ Shandong U., Zhihe Wang, Prof. @ School of Phil. And Soc. Sci. @ Beijing Normal U., and George E. Derfer, School of Philosophy and the Social Sciences, and George E. Derfer, Prof. Emeritus @ Cal. Poly. Pomona, “Whitehead and China: Relevance and Relationship”, p. 28, Google Print)

**The threats posed by** war, imperialism, **nuclear weapons**, and terrorism **are**, furthermore, not the only **threats to the continued existence of civilization** for which global anarchy is responsible. There are also the interconnected threats of pollution, overpopulation, and resource shortages. Although there has been serious discussion of the population explosion since the 1960s, very little has been done tos top it. China is one of the few countries to have introduced effective measures to bring a halt to runaway population growth. In most of the rest of the world, continuation of the population explosion means that already struggling societies will, in the coming decades, be trying to meet the needs of twice as many people with the same resources, or even fewer. **Resource wars**, meaning wars in which natural resources are the primary cause, **will** surely **become increasingly prevalent. As** absolute **shortages in food**, water, and oil emerge, furthermore, the relative shortages, produced by the world’s highly inequitable allocation of resources, will **become** even **more intolerable to disadvantaged groups**, providing additional motivation for terrorism aagainst rich countries. Global apartheid combined with **growing resource shortages combined with hatred of imperialism combined with nuclearism makes for a very volatile mixture**.

***Empirics – Arab Spring conflict was the result of food insecurity***

**Vidal ’13** John Vidal, environment editor for The Guardian; “Climate change: how a warming world is a threat to our food supplies;” Apr 13 2013; The Guardian: The Observer http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2013/apr/13/climate-change-threat-food-supplies RMJ

When the Tunisian street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, set himself on fire on 17 December 2010, it was in protest at heavy-handed treatment and harassment in the province where he lived. But a host of new studies suggest that a major factor in the subsequent uprisings, which became known as the Arab spring, was food insecurity. Drought, rocketing bread prices, food and water shortages have all blighted parts of the Middle East. Analysts at the Centre for American Progress in Washington say a combination of food shortages and other environmental factors exacerbated the already tense politics of the region. As the Observer reports today, an as-yet unpublished US government study indicates that the world needs to prepare for much more of the same, as food prices spiral and longstanding agricultural practices are disrupted by climate change.